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AMENDMENT BY DECISION-MORE ON THE
ERIE CASE.
LAWRENCE EARL BROH-KAHN*

The case of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins1 wrought such a revolution in our jurisprudence that the tendency has been to accept it
at face value without giving much thought to its fundamental
tenet. The writer believes that despite the vast amount of literatare devoted to the subject of the Erie case, its fundamental
tenet has received far too scant, if any, attention. In view of
the importance of the subject, it is believed it will not be unprofitable to reexamine the decision in the light of its basic thesis.
The Rules of Decision Act2 provides that "except where the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, the laws of the several states shall be
regarded as rules of decision in the trials at common law" in
cases where they apply. In Swift v. Tyson,8 decided in 1842,
the Supreme Court held that the Rules of Decision Act did not
apply to matters of general commercial law, that in such matters
the federal courts were not bound to follow the decisions of state
courts, and that the Act compelled the federal courts to follow
decisions of the state courts only in questions involving the interpretation of state statutes and constitutional provisions and in
purely local state matters such as real property law. The theory
of the court in Swift v. Tyson and the later cases was that court
decisions are merely declaratory in character, that they do not
* A.B., 1924, and A.M., 1926, University of Cincinnati; LL.B., 1936,

Harvard. Associated with the law firm of Williams, Eversman &
Morgan, Toledo, Ohio. Admitted to practice in the Ohio Supreme
Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the,
United States Supreme Court.
1304 U. S. 64 (1938).

'28 U. S. C. A. I 725.
16 Pet. 1.
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make the law but merely discover or ferret it out, that they are
frequently overruled and cannot therefore be said to establish
the law of a particular jurisdiction, and that such being the case
the federal courts are as competent to determine questions of
state law, except in respect of statutes, constitutions and purely
local matters, as the state courts themselves.
Erie B. B. v. Tompkins overruled Swift v. Tyson and its subsequent extensions, and completely abolished the century-old
distinction between general and local law. It held that state
court decisions establish the law of the state in the same manner
that constitutions and statutes do.
The decision in the Erie case was due very largely to certain
investigations and discoveries of Mr. Charles Warren 4 who had
unearthed in the Senate archives the original draft of the Rules
of Decision Act. In that draft, it appeared the intention of the
party who proposed it to compel the federal courts to follow the
decisions of state courts both in matters of statutory and common
law. Mr. Warren, therefore, concluded that by substituting in
the final form of the Act as we now have it the generic term,
"laws of the several states", for the particular terms, "statute
law of the several states . . . and their unwritten or common
law .... ", the first Congress had not intended to limit the
application of the Act to written law and decisions on purely
local questions but had, on the contrary, intended to compel the
federal courts to follow the state law in all matters, whether
determined by legislation or court decision. The Supreme
Court adopted Mr. Warren's conclusion. The Court might
therefore, have overruled Swift v. Tyson on purely statutory
grounds and held that in 1842, without the benefit of the original
draft of the Rules of Decision Act before them, the Court had
misconstrued'that Act and given to it a too limited application.
But the Court felt that it could not dispose of the Erie case
on purely statutory grounds; for Congress had, for well-nigh a
hundred years, acquiesced in the interpretation given to the
Rules of Decision Act by Swift v. Tyson and had in fact reenacted it into the Revised Statutes. The Court further felt that
"If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
'The History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
Harv. L. Rev. 49.

TaE

ERIE CAsr

throughout nearly a century.2"5 The court, therefore, proceeded
to "hold" that the Rules of Decision Act was merely declaratory
of the judicial power of the federal courts under Article III
of the Constitution, that "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state", 6 that "no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon
the federal courts",7 and that the federal courts cannot constitutionally, in matters of state law, reach different results from
those reached by the highest courts of the states. The Erie
case is clearly a constitutional decision.
If the researches of Mr. Warren disclosed the error of the
Court in Swift v. Tyson, the Court could certainly have overthrown that doctrine despite its reluctance to abandon a rule of
law so widely applied for so long a time and acquiesced in and
apparently reenacted by Congress. The Court could have done
this if it regarded the error of statutory interpretation as serious
and if the practical consequedces of the error necessitated a
reversion to the true doctrine. But the Court preferred to
rest its decision on constitutional grounds. To a certain extent,
therefore, the decision is dictum, since the result could be
explained on the basis of Mr. Warren's discovery and since the
case might have been disposed of on statutory grounds.8 It is
the purpose of this article to reexamine the constitutional decision or dictum in the Erie case.
As the judicial power of the federal courts, whether independent of, or subordinate to, the state courts in matters of state
law, stems from the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, the
interpretation and significance of that Article are both the
1304 U. S. at 77.
1'304 U. S. at 78.

id.
'Mr. Warren, op. cit. supra note 4, pointed out that it was the
intention of the first Congress to confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction of common law crimes. Mr. Warren suggests that in limiting
their jurisdiction to statutory crimes the federal courts have erred as
grievously as did the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson with respect
to the Rules of Decision Act. It may be that the Court in the Erie
case apprehended the inconsistency of adopting the discovery of Mr.
Warren with reference to the Rules of Decision Act and rejecting his
discovery with reference to jurisdiction over common law crimes.
And it may be that the Court was unwilling to reconsider the question of jurisdiction over common law crimes. Hence, the Court may
have felt compelled to reject the statutory ground as the basis for
overruling Swift v. Tyson and may have felt it necessary to achieve
that result by resort to a constitutional assault on that decision.
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terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of our reexamination
of the Erie case. However, since the Supreme Court has recognized what is an otherwise demonstrable fact, that the members
'of the first Congress were thoroughly familiar with the import
of the Constitution and that the Judiciary Act, passed by the
first Congress, "is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its
true meaning", 9 we may, for purposes of convenience, first consider the Judiciary Act of 1789 in order to ascertain the significance which the first Congress ascribed or imputed to the Judiciary Article of the Constitution.
The Rules of Decision section is an integral part of the first
Judiciary Act as finally enacted by the first Congress. It was
not a part of the draft bill which, when enacted, became the Judiciary Act.1 0 It was incorporated into the Act as the result of an
amendment proposed from the floor after the draft bill had been
submitted to the Senate for consideration. Its present and
original position in the Act is Section 34. Its natural and
intended position is between Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.1
The thought, therefore, at once suggests itself that the Rules of
Decision section was an afterthought. The necessity of incorporating it into the Act did not occur to the Senate committee
responsible for drafting the Judiciary bill.
This suggestion is a two-edged sword with respect to our
problem. It might be inferred that the Senate committee
charged with the drafting of the bill deemed the substance of the
Rules of Decision section already inherent in the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution, that they thought the Constitution
required the federal courts in matters of state law to follow the
state courts, and that they did not consider it necessary to make
a separate declaratory provision to that effect in the Judiciary
Act. On the other hand, it might equally be inferred that the
absence of such a provision in the Judiciary bill aroused the
fears and suspicious of the anti-federalist and anti-constitutional
members of the Senate, th.at they either believed the Judiciary
Article conferred too extensive and independent powers on the
federal court or they entertained some doubt on the matter, and
that they insisted on imposing by means of Section 34 some
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297 (1888).
"Warren, op. cit., pp. 50, 85-87.

u ibid.
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limitation on the power of the federal courts in questions of state
law. It would seem, from a general knowledge of human psychology and a fair understanding of the legislative process, that
the second interpretation is the more reasonable one. At any
rate, a mass of evidence which we shall discuss appears to support this view and better to explain the absence of anything
comparable to Section 34 in the draft bill and its proposel from
the floor of the Senate as an amendment which was adopted and
incorporated into the Act.
The Rules of Decision section furnishes several clues in support of the view that it is a limitation on, and not declaratory
of, the judicial power of the federal courts under the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution. The section provides that federal
courts shall regard the laws of the several states as rules of
decision "except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of
the United States shall otherwise require or provide". Of
course, if the Constitution should "otherwise require or provide", there is no question but what the federal courts should not
only be permitted, but should have, to disregard the laws of the
several states; for the Constitution is both a delegation of power
to the federal government and all its agencies and a limitation on
the power of the states to the extent of that delegation. If the
Constitution requires the federal courts to ignore state law in a
particular matter (e.g., due process, equal protection, full faith
and credit, privileges and immunities, intrastate commerce that
affects interstate commerce, etc.), the federal courts would not
have to follow the state law and, in fact, would be bound to disregard it.
In the case of treaties, the independence of federal courts
of the state law is less clear but none the less equally convincing.
Only the federal government can make treaties with foreign
powers. The states are expressly denied authority over foreign
affairs.
Now, let us suppose that the United States should enter into
a treaty with a foreign government which concerned and
vitally affected the purely local laws of a particular state or
states. The treaty might provide that all questions involving the
domestic relations of accredited representatives of the particular
foreign power should be determined in the federal courts and
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not be submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of a sovereignty with which the foreign government had no relations.
Or a treaty might provide that in matters involving tort, contract and property rights of foreign government representatives
such as ambassadors and consuls, all questions of substantive
law when once submitted to the jurisdiction of the federal courts
shall be determined by those courts in accordance with certain
general or particular legal principles, without reference to the
laws of a state, even though those laws were otherwise applicable.
A treaty might provide that administration should be taken out
for the property and estate of a non-resident alien in the county
of the state where he happened to die while on a sojourn in this
country. Or it might provide that such administration should
be taken out in another county where the alien left property of
some sort or where he did not leave property, or where the
consul of his government resided.
All such treaty provisions-and numerous others might be
conceived-would be directly contrary to our present notions
of jurisdiction, judicial propriety and governing law. But we
are concerned with the judicial power of the federal courts under
the Constitution and, therefore, need not consider whether the
executive, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
would for those reasons not negotiate and make such treaties.
His power to do so is ample. The President, with the concurrence of the Senate, may "make treaties". The scope of
treaties is not, as in the case of statutes under the "necessary
and proper" clause or under the "supreme law of the land"
clause, limited to treaties which carry "into execution the foregoing (expressly delegated) powers" '12- or "which shall be made
in pursuance (of the Constitution) ".13 The scope of treaties
may go beyond expressly delegated powers and even conflict
with the otherwise reserved powers of the states. In respect to
such matters, the scope of treaties is unlimited and depends
solely upon questions of policy and, of course, the action of the
President and the concurrence of the Senate. Treaties are the
"Supreme Law of the Land" if made "under the authority of
the United States",'' - that is, by the President with the con"U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8 (18).
"U. S. Const., Art. VI (2).
'4 ibid.
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currence of the Senate. When so made and executed, they are
binding not only upon "the Judges in every State" but likewise
upon all agencies and departments of the federal government,
including, of course, the federal courts.
By the express terms of the Rules of Decision section
("except where

the Constitution

(or)

treaties

. .

of the

United States shall otherwise require or provide"), both the
federal and state courts are bound by the provisions of treaties
duly made, regardless of how absurd they may seem as a question of policy. Hence, if treaties were made containing any of
the foregoing suggested provisions, state courts would, in matters
of probate and administration, have to disregard fundamental
tenets of testamentary jurisdiction ;15 federal courts would have
to assume a limited jurisdiction over domestic relations;16 and
I Bucyrus Steel Casting Co. v. Farkas, 15 0. N. P. (N. S.) 609
(Ohio C. P., 1914); In re Stingacs, 12 0. N. P. (N. S.) 107 (Ohio C. P.,
1911).
I In State of Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379 (1930),
the Court held that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over cases
involving the domestic relations of accredited representatives of
foreign governments (The case involved a suit for divorce brought
against the vice-consul of the Rumanian government; but the decision is applicable to ambassadors as well and likewise to all questions
of domestic relations). As a question of statutory construction (that
is, whether the enabling sections of the judicial code vest exclusive
jurisdiction over such matters in the federal courts), the decision
may or may not be right. But, the decision is a constitutional one.
The Court said that the Constitution must be interpreted in the light
of its setting and that since in 1789 domestic relations were deemed
the concern of the several states, the judiciary provisions of the Constitution must have left them in the states where they then reposed.
As a constitutional decision, the case must be regarded as patently
unsound. It reads into the Judiciary Article an historical limitation
or exception ("It has been understood that the whole subject of
domestic relations . . . belongs to the laws of the states, and not to

the laws of the United States," 280 U. S. 379, 383) which is nonexistant. It does violence to the plain language of Article III which
provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases affecting
ambassadors and that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors (a plainly self-executing provision). And divorce is such a case. Cf. Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U. S. 562 (1906). Hence, there should be jurisdiction of such cases
in the Supreme Court even in the absence of an enabling statute.
The Judiciarij Article also extends the judicial power to all cases
arising under treaties made under the authority of the United States.
A treaty so made might well require that the federal courts shall
exercise jurisdiction over divorce cases involving accredited representatives of the foreign government. If an enabling act were required
to warrant the Supreme Court's exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction over ambassadors, a treaty so made would constitute such an
enabling act. And if the Court held that it could not act even under
such a treaty provision, it would be tantamount to holding the treaty
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federal courts would have to follow the exception rather than
the direction of the Rules of Decision section in some matters of
purely local state law. The duties imposed upon the federal
courts in such instances would, of course, be impossible if the
Judiciary Article of the Constitution contained any inherent
limitations on the power of the federal courts in matters of
state law.
We shall subsequently consider whether the Judiciary
Article in and of itself contains such inherent limitations. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the members of
the first Congress did not think it did. They expressly excepted
from the operation of the Rules of Decision section all requirements and provisions of treaties. If they had intended to free
federal courts from dependence on state law only in the case of
treaties which did not interfere with the reserved powers of the
17
states, they could well have said SO.
The provision in the Rules of Decision section which disunconstitutional to that extent, which would be a rather anomalous
manner of dealing with the plenary treaty making power which is
vested in the national government (see note 15, supra).
If the various provisions of the Judicial Code which distribute
the judicial power respecting ambassadors between the Supreme
Court and the district courts are valid and deprive the Supreme
Court of its plainly conferred jurisdiction, and if those provisions did
not vest the district courts with divorce jurisdiction, the district
courts would nevertheless have to assume it under such a treaty
provision-at least, with respect to the ambassadors of the particular
foreign government; for such a treaty would be the necessary enabling
act if any were required. As a constitutional decision, the Popovici
case is, therefore, plainly wrong.
There is at the end of the opinion a cryptic remark which may
indicate that the Court felt it was treading on extremely tenuous
ground. "In the absence of any provision in the Constitution or laws
of the United States, it is for the state to decide how far it will go",
280 U. S. 379, 384. If this means that the Constitution, laws or
treaties could expressly deprive the states of jurisdiction over such
matters and at the same time entrust them to the federal judicial
power, it accords with what we have pointed out the Constitution
already provides, except that the Judiciary Article while vesting the
federal courts with such jurisdiction does not expressly deprive the
state courts of their jurisdiction. If the statement does not bear this
interpretation, its significance will not readily be apprehended.
I See note 19, infra. If the exception had been phrased in this
manner, a subsequent treaty, approved only by the Senate without
the concurrence of the House, might not be sufficient to render the
exception inapplicable to the provisions of the treaty and, therefore,
the exception might be invalid as interfering with a treaty made
"under the authority of the United States". And query, whether such
an exception would be valid as to a treaty already in existence:
Should Congress thus unilaterally be permitted to abrogate a treaty?
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charges federal courts of its mandate "where the . . . statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide" is less clear
even than the exception with, respect to treaties. Whether a
federal statute could constitutionally require the federal courts
to disregard the laws of the several states in purely local state
matters cannot, of course, be resolved until we determine the
scope and significance of the Judiciary Article itself. But this
much is clear at this point. The members of the first Congress
were familiar with the meaning and intent of the Judiciary
Article. In the Rules of Decision section, they merely excepted
from its operation the provisions or requirements of statutes
of the United States. They did not except the provisions and
requirements of only those statutes which were otherwise constitutionally valid or which, in other words, "shall be made in
pursuance (of the Constitution)" or "which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing (expressly
delegated) powers", as the Constitution itself, apart from the
Judiciary Article and Article I, See. 8, el. 9,18 contemplates
the scope of statutory enactments. Had the members of the
first Congress apprehended what the Supreme Court asserted
in the Erie case was a constitutional limitation on the judicial
power of the federal courts, they could well h.ave limited the
scope of the exception with respect to statutes in the Rules of
Decision section. The fact that they did not do so furnishes
additional evidence that they did not regard that section as
merely declaratory but as a limitation on the Judiciary Article
of the Constitution. 19
The Rules of Decision section applies only "in the trials
at common law". It does not apply to equity, to admiralty or
to crimes. With, respect to crimes, it could certainly be contended-and this is, in fact, the accepted view-that since Congress alone had jurisdiction over crimes against the nation and
did not have jurisdiction over common law crimes 20 or crimes
"To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
"Speaking of the lack of power of federal courts in patent cases,
Livingston, J., said in Livingston v. Van Ingen, 1 Paine 45, 51
(C. C. N. Y. 1181): "It cannot be believed that, in a law drawn with
so much care, and embracing such a variety of provisions, so important an omission was casual. It must have been the result of much
reflection, and shows their sense at least, that Congress were not
bound to clothe the courts which they might create with all the
powers which by the Constitution they had the right to confer."
2 See note 8, supra.
L. J.-2

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

against a particular state, the federal courts in dealing with
national crimes were subject only to the pertinent enactments
of Congress or were thrust upon their own resources in evolving
the appropriate governing principles. 2 1 Similarly, it could
perhaps be claimed that admiralty is a matter of national
jurisdiction and, therefore, that the federal courts were in such
22
matters independent of state law.

But what about equity? No argument could be made that
equity is peculiarly a matter of national cognizance. The contrary has been repeatedly held. And although the Supreme
Court has declared, both before and after the Brie case, that
despite the failure of the Rules of Decision section to cover
suits in equity the federal courts should nevertheless in such
matters follow the applicable state law,23 the fact remains that

there is no mandate to that effect in the section itself. It covers
only trials at common law. Can this failure to provide for
suits in equity have been an oversight or the result of negligence
or careless draftsmanship? A study of the history of the first
Judiciary Act and an examination of its contents does not
'Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933); cf. O'Brien v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F. (2d) 539 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
The Judicial Code, Section 256, amended (28 U. S. C. A., Section
371), provides that the federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The
Judiciary Article extends the judicial power to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. The debates of the Constitutional Convention and the debates on the first Judiciary Act show that even
those who objected to the creation of inferior federal courts or who
objected to giving such courts the extensive constitutional jurisdiction they now possess were willing to subscribe to the creation of a
special national court for admiralty and maritime matters. But that
the extension of the judicial power to all admiralty cases was not in
itself deemed sufficient to confer an exclusive admiralty jurisdiction
on the federal courts is clear from the fact that the state courts were
invested with admiralty jurisdiction for three years after the adoption
of the Constitution. See note 56, infra. Mr. Justice Johnson, speaking for the Court in Manro v. Joseph Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473, 490
(1825), said: "We had then (i.e., in 1792 when the Process Act was
enacted) been sixteen years an independent people, and had administered the admiralty jurisdiction, as well in admiralty courts of the
states as in those of the general government; . . . during the three

years (i.e., 1789 to 1792) that the admiralty courts of these states were
referred to the practice of the civil law , . . there could have been

no question that this process was legalized." Admiralty was thus
primarily but not inherently a matter of national concern. Similarly,
it was not exclusively subject to the federal judicial power until Congress deprived the state courts of admiralty jurisdiction.
'Russell v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280 (1940); Ruhlin v. New York L.

Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938); Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545
(1923).
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disclose such carelessness or poor draftsmanship in other
respects. 24 On the contrary, such a study discloses the extreme
precision with which the draftsmen approached their task and
likewise the vigilance of members on the floor of the two houses
to deal with and correct any defects, inaccuracies, or objectionable provisions. The bill, as enacted, was the result of extensive
and meticulous deliberation and became law only after an
abundance of compromise. Not a provision, not an omission
escaped the attention of both those who sympathized with, and
those who were hostile to, the first Judiciary Act.
Why then did Congress fail to make the Rules of Decision
section applicable to suits in equity? The answer would seem
obvious to anyone unfettered by the lore of judicial tradition.
They did not deem that section declaratory of the Judiciary
Article! They did not feel that the federal courts were or
should be bound by the laws of the several states in suits in
equity! We shall later discuss the diversity of citizenship
clause in the Judiciary Article and shall again have occasion
to refer to this failure of Congress to make the Rules of Decision
section applicable to suits in equity. But certainly, at this
point, the failure to so provide would seem to be eloquent
evidence of the scope and significance which the first Congress
ascribed to the Judiciary Article and the judicial power of
the federal courts thereunder. Clearly Congress must have
thought that the federal courts should be subservient to the
laws of the several states only "in the trials at common law".
Let us assume, however, for the moment, that the Rules of
Decision section is merely declaratory of the judicial power of
the federal courts under the Constitution. Assume that it is
declaratory with respect to trials at common law or suits in
equity or both. Then a rather startling fact appears. It is
the only section in the first Judiciary Act which, both as
originally proposed and as finally enacted, that is declaratory!
Not a single other section in the first Judiciary Act, both as
originally proposed and as finally enacted, is declaratory of the
Judiciary Article. All others are either enabling sections or are
limitational in nature and restrict the powers of the federal
courts which they would otherwise concededly possess. 25 Only
See note 19, supra.
BSee note 19, supra. Also see Ellsworth, C. J., in Turner v.
Bank, 4 Dall. 8 (1799), to the effect that the federal courts have
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the Rules of Decision section is declaratory of the Judiciary
Article!
But it may be said that Section 16 of the Act is also
declaratory. It provides that "suits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any
case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had
at law". In a negative way, this section confers upon courts
of equity in the federal system the same powers which they
possessed at common law, prior to the adoption of the Constitution. It is, therefore, clearly declaratory, not necessarily
of the Judiciary Article, but of the inherent powers of equity
courts at common law. Nevertheless, in so far as the Constitution, in speaking of the judicial power of federal courts in
equity cases, may be deemed to have incorporated into its
fabric preexisting principles of jurisprudence, it may be said
that the Equity section of the Judiciary Act, as finally enacted,
is declaratory of the Judiciary Article.
As originally proposed, however, in the draft bill, the
Equity section of the Act was declaratory of neither the
Judiciary Article nor the inherent powers of equity courts at
common law. It provided "that suits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any
case where a remedy may be had at law".26 If the remedy at
law were not plain, or were not adequate, or were not complete,
federal equity courts would have no jurisdiction if any remedy
at law existed. It was not necessary, under the section as it
appeared in the draft bill, that the remedy at law should be
plain, adequate and complete. It sufficed, to deprive federal
courts of equity jurisdiction, that some legal remedy existed,
no matter how uncertain, inadequate or incomplete.
"cognizance, not of cases generally, but of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases which an
unlimited jurisdiction would embrace". See also Washington, J.,
in Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash, 232, 237 (C. C. 1805):

"Whether it

would have been wise in Congress to have vested in the National

Courts, the power of deciding, in some way or other, every national
question, authorized by the Constitution is another point. I am

one of those, I confess, who have always thought it would have been

better, if the Legislature of the Union, in allotting to the several
Courts the jurisdiction they were to exercise, had occupied the whole
ground marked out by the Constitution; ....
"

'Warren, op. cit., 96. Warren points out that amendments to
the draft of the section were proposed several times by adding one
of the words, "plain, adequate and complete", in each proposed
amendment, until the draft section was given its present form.

THE ERm CASE
The section, therefore, as originally proposed was clearly
limitational. It imposed considerable restrictions on the federal
courts in their exercise of equity jurisdiction and contracted
that jurisdiction as it existed at common law and may be said
to have been incorporated into the texture of the Constitution.
Why the section should have aroused such a storm of protest
is not readily apparent except perhaps that some of the irreconcilable anti-constitutionalists in Congress may have thought that
equity jurisdiction should be abolished altogether, and jury
trial employed in all cases. At any rate, the protest and
criticism were insistent and something had to be done about the
section.
This could be accomplished in either of two ways. Paterson
of New Jersey, a member of the Judiciary Committee of the
Senate which drafted the bill, moved to "dele" the whole
section.2 7 He obviously reasoned that even without the section
federal equity courts would, under the Judiciary Article,
possess the same equity powers which they possessed at common
law, that is, they would have jurisdiction when a plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law was not available. It was, therefore, unnecessary to make provision in the Judiciary Act for
the equity powers of federal courts. They would inherently
possess these powers. And Paterson apparently did not believe
in doing the supererogatory thing of amending the section and
thereby conferring upon the federal courts equity powers that
they would possess even in the absence of such provisions.
In other words, he apparently did not believe in enacting a
declaratory section.
Paterson, however, did not prevail. The majority of the
Senate apparently felt that amendment would be the simpler
process and that it would not upset the arrangement of sections
in the Act as a deletion would. So the section was amended
and thus became declaratory of the powers of equity courts at
common law and, indirectly, their power under the Judiciary
Article. The history of the Equity section thus makes it
abundantly clear how and why the section happens to be
declaratory.
The history of the Rules of Decision section is quite
different. If it is declaratory now, it was declaratory as
'7 Warren,

op. cit., 96.
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originally proposed. The only change or amendment which it
suffered in the course of the debate on the Act was the sub,
stitution of the generic term "laws of the several states" for
the particular terms "Statute law of the several states . . .
and their unwritten or common law". 28 It was thus either
declaratory or a limitation on the Judiciary Article both as
originally proposed and as finally enacted.
The query naturally poses itself, why should the first
Congress have proposed and adopted this single, declaratory
section in the whole Judiciary Act?. The declaratory character
of the Equity section has already been explained. The Rules
of Decision section would stand alone as evidence of the effort
of the first Congress to do a vain thing and to confer upon or
restrict the federal courts in the exercise of powers which they
already possessed or which they eduld not exercise under the
Constitution. This fact, when taken together with the further
fact that the Rules of Decision section does not appear in the
draft bill but was first proposed from the floor of the Senate
indicates, it would seem, not only that the Senate Judiciary
Committee did not see fit to make the federal courts in state
matters subservient to state law and that they did not deem
such subservience inherent in the provisions of the Judiciary
Article, but also that Congress did not regard the Rules of
Decision section as declaratory but as a limitation on the
Judiciary Article.
Whether it was wise, as a question of policy, to impose
this limitation on the Judiciary Article and thus to confine
or restrict the judicial power of the federal courts is beside the
point. The first Congress were thoroughly familiar with the
meaning and intent of the Constitution and the Judiciary
Article. Many of its members had a large share in the drafting
of the Constitution. Half of the ten members of the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate, which drafted the Judiciary Act, had
been members of the Constitutional Convention. Hence, when
the first Congress by means of the Rules of Decision section
limited the powers of the federal courts and directed them,
except in certain instances to follow the laws of the several
' id. 86-87. If the Erie case is right, the change was one of form
and not of substance. If Swift v. Tyson was right, the change was
one of substance but it still would not affect the declaratory nature
of the section both as originally proposed and as finally enacted.
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states, it my be said that they did so consciously, deliberately
and with full awareness that they were enacting a limitation
rather than a declaratory section.
Up to this point, an attempt has been made to demonstrate
that the Rules of Decision section is, both on the surface andj
as a result of the compelling disclosures of certain internal
evidence, a limitation on the powers of the federal judiciary
and not a mere declaration of those powers. Each argument
and each bit of evidence is cumulative. All tally up to the
conclusion that the Erie case is unsound as a constitutional
decision. In reaching this conclusion on the basis of a study
of the Rules of Decision sectibn, we have relied entirely on
that section. If the Judiciary Article expressly limited the
powers of the federal courts so as to confer upon them independence of decision only in matters within the scope of concretely
delegated powers of the national government and to compel them
to follow the state law in other matters, all the foregoing arguments would collapse; and the intent and meaning which we
have found the first Congress ascribed to the Judiciary Article
would prove to be a mere figment of the imagination. In order,
therefore, to pursue the inquiry further and save ourselves from
this dilemma, it becomes necessary to consider the Judiciary
Article itself.
The first section of the Article vests the "judicial power"
of the United States in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as Congress may establish from time to time. The second
section provides that the "judicial power" shall extend to
certain enumerated cases and controversies."0 In three instances
(cases arising under the Constitution, statutes and treaties;
cases affecting ambassadors, etc.; and cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction), the federal judicial power is made
inclusive. It extends to all cases pertaining to such matters.
In the remaining instances, the judicial power is not expressly
made to extend to all the enumerated controversies. It merely
extends to the enumerated controversies. In such controversies,
the federal judicial power may perhaps be shared by other
judiciaries.
The Article thus does not confer jurisdiction upon the
"A distinction has occasionally been drawn between the terms
"case" and "controversy". So far as the federal judicial power is
concerned, however, their significance is identical.
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federal courts. It vests in them judiciaZ power and extends the
judicial power of the United States to the enumerated cases and
controversies. Jurisdiction, in common legal parlance, is the
power of a court to act upon a particular subject matter, such
as equity, admiralty, a certain sum of money, and the like.
Judicial power is a more comprehensive term. It includes
jurisdiction or the power to act. But it goes beyond that.
It includes the power which is inherent in all courts to decide
and completely dispose of all matters to which their jurisdiction
has once attached,3 0 subject only to correction by a tribunal
of ultimate review. Judicial power is the germinating fluid,
the fons vitae of a court, the power that gives it independence
and vitality and distinguishes it from all other governmental
agencies. It is the power to decide, to pronounce law and to
resolve all controversies that come within its jurisdiction.
A court may have and exercise jurisdiction without possessing
judicial power. In the Brie case, the court held that federal
courts possess jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases;
but it also held that they do not have the judicial power to
determine, decide and resolve the controversy, but must merely
apply the decisions of the state courts. On the other hand, A
court cannot possess or exercise judicial power without having
first assumed jurisdiction. Judicial power is comprehensive,
jurisdiction is particularistic.
It is no accident that the Judiciary Article invests the
federal courts with judicial power rather than the more limited
jurisdiction. All of the original drafts, except one, of the
Judiciary Article in the various plans for a constitution which
were proposed to the Convention contained a grant of "jurisdiction" rather than "judicial power" to the federal courts
and extended their "jurisdiction" to certain subject matters.8 1
"Warren, The Making of the Constitution (1928) 331-332.
'Journal of The Debates, U. S. Constitutional Convention 1787
(Hunt ed. 1908): Randolph plan, 17, 131; Pinckney plan, 29; Report
of Committee of Whole on Randolph plan, 136; Hamilton plan, 163,
171; see also remarks of Mr. Wilson contrasting the Randolph and
Paterson plans, 147. The exception was the Paterson plan which
provided that the "judiciary so established shall have authority to
hear and determine . . . ." The Paterson plan was anti-national.
Paterson's choice of words, "hear and determine" is therefore significant. He apparently intended to confer upon the federal courts both
jurisdiction ("hear") and judicial power ("determine") in the few
matters entrusted to their "authority".
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Members of the Convention continued to speak of the jurisdiction of the federal courts from the beginning of the Convention until late in August. The term, "jurisdiction",
remained in the Judiciary Articles of the various plans for a
Constitution until August 27, 1789, and subsequently, when
the term, "judicial power", was substituted for "jurisdiction"
in the various parts of the Judiciary Article where it" was
employed. 32 This was a conscious and deliberate effort of the
Convention to employ not only a more elegant term but likewise
a more comprehensive one. The Convention thus sought to
invest the federal courts with complete independence and with
full power to decide and resolve in their own way all cases
and controversies to which their jurisdiction attached.
It should not, however, be inferred that the scope and
significance of the Judiciary Article would have been any more
limited if it had contained the term, "jurisdiction", and had
invested the federal courts merely with jurisdiction rather
than judicial power. 33 There is enough internal and external
evidence in the Constitution itself and in the Debates of the
Convention and other contemporary literature to disclose that
it was the intent of the Convention to confer "judicial power"
and complete independence on the federal courts in the
enumerated situations, regardless of the term actually employed
to express that intent. In other words, the result would be the
same even if the Convention had invested the courts with
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, in discussing the Judiciary
Article in The Federalist, 34 Hamilton employs the term,
"jurisdiction", in its broader sense of judicial power. He
defines the word etymologically as "a speaking and pronouncing of the law", from the Latin words, jus and dictio.
" 2 Records of Federal Convention (Ed. Farrand 1937) 425- see
also remarks of Madison and Governor Morris, id. 431.
' Madison, for example, proposed that the "jurisdiction shall
extend to all cases arising under the National laws; and to such other
questions as may involve the National peace and harmony . . . ."
Journal of The Debates, 389. Madison no doubt assumed that the
courts were given full independent judicial power in cases arising
under the national laws. And his proposal to extend the federal
jurisdiction in the same terms to the other matters involving the
national peace and harmony and subsequently expressly incorporated
into the Judiciary Article indicates that he assumed the federal courts
would act upon those matters in the same manner, that is, with theexercise of a complete, independent judicial power.
"No. LXXXIII (Lodge ed. 1923) 519.
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Such a "speaking and pronouncing of the law", of course,
signifies the complete independence and power of the court to
apply the law as it has determined it to any controversy over
which it has assumed jurisdiction. And, in another of those
papers, 35 he speaks of the judiciary's power of "determining"
various causes. He does not say that the court may, in reliance
upon some other tribunal, act upon or entertain jurisdiction
over the various causes. He takes it for granted tha, the
judiciary, under the grant of the Constitution, may determine,
that is, decide, resolve and completely dispose of those causes.
Now, the theory of the Court in the Erie case appears to be
that the federal courts merely possess this judicial power to
decide controversies involving or pertaining to the delegated
powers of Congress; that every delegated power (e.g., bankruptcy, naturalization, coinage, commerce, etc.) is expressly
conferred upon the national government; and that there is no
express or implied delegation of powers to or in respect of the
federal courts either in the Judiciary Article or in any other
provision of the Constitution. If these assumptions were correct,
the constitutional decision in the Erie case would be unassailable.
But, is such the fact? We have just seen that these assumptions
are irreconcilable with the grant of "judicial power" in the
Judiciary Article. Further study of that Article supports this
conclusion.
The Judiciary Article invests the federal courts with
judicial power over certain causes. In some causes, the judicial
power is expressly comprehensive or inclusive; in the remainder,
it is at best only inferentially so; or perhaps it is distributive,
concurrent or partial. 36 But in respect of all the various causes,
the grant of judicial power is identical. The judicial power is
made to extend to "all Cases, in Law and Equity (under the
Constitution, treaties and Laws of the United States) ;-to all
cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction
(n.b.) ;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party ;-to Controversies between two or more States ;-(to Controversies) between a State and Citizens of another State ;-(to
Controversies) between Citizens of different States;-(to ConNo. LXXX (Lodge ed.) 496.
'That is to say, it extends to some of the enumerated controversies.
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troversies) between Citizens of the same State claiming lands
under grants of different States, and (to Controversies)
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects."
The same "judicial power" which is extended to all federal
questions and all cases affecting ambassadors and all questions
of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction likewise extends to controversies between citizens of different states, controversies
between states, controversies to which the United States is a
party, controversies involving land grants of different states,
controversies between a state and citizens of another state, and
controversies between a state or its citizens and foreign states,
their citizens or subjects. Hence, without any reference to the
relation of the exercise of judicial power to expressly delegated
legislative power, it would seem that if the federal courts are
independent and have complete judicial power to determine and
dispose of all federal questions, by virtue of the same grant of
judicial power they should possess the same independence and
full power of disposition with respect to the remaining
37
enumerated controversies over which they have judicial power.
Does the fact that certain expressly delegated powers confine
the scope of activity by Congress also limit the judicial power
of the federal courts under Article III?
The answer must be in the negative. If express delegation
to Congress alone were the key to the scope of the judicial
power, then the extension of judicial power to non-federal
diversity of citizenship cases in Article III would be unconstitutional! At least, it would be in direct conflict with the
other delegating provisions of the Constitution and, if valid,
would to that extent have to be deemed an affirmative grant or
delegation. Similarly, if the exercise of complete judicial power
depended upon a collateral delegation of powers to Congress,
the federal courts would not possess such powers in matters
beyond the scope of congressional action. Thus, Congress has
'7 The thought will at once occur that this independent power of
decision and absolute supremacy of the federal courts in federal questions derives from the fact that federal questions arise under the
Constitution, treaties and statutes which are the supreme law of the
land, and that the judicial determination of these questions must likewise be the supreme law of the land. As will subsequently appear,
this explanation does not account for other federal judicial phenomena and must be laid aside as unsatisfactory.
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no affirmative or implied power over the states. Congress has
no affirmative or implied power over matters of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; for the Commerce Clause confers
no such power any more than it does with respect to nonmaritime matters involving interstate and foreign commerce.
Congress has no power over matters between a state and citizens
of another state,38 over matters involving land grants of different
states to citizens of the same state, or over matters between a
state or its citizens and a foreign state, its citizens or subjects.
And it may be queried whether Congress has any affirmative or
implied power over a controversy just because the United
States happens to be a party, even though it may no, involve
or pertain to the assertion or enforcement of a delegated power.
Nevertheless, in many, if not all, of these matters, the federal
courts have exercised and undoubtedly possess the judicial
power completely to determine and dispose of the controversy
before them, without reference to or reliance upon any other
tribunal or system of laws. Thus, two states, A and B, may be
involved in certain difficulties of tort, contract or property law.
According to the fundamental and somewhat recently reiterated
law of sovereignty,3 9 State A could not sue State B in the courts
of B; and it could not obtain jurisdiction over B in its own
courts. The natural forum, of necessity, is, therefore, the
Supreme Court of the United States. What law should the
court apply in disposing of the controversy? What law must the
court constitutionally apply, if under the Erie case the federal
courts are bound by the non-federal law and merely have
jurisdiction and not judicial power over the controversy?
If the relations between sovereigns were governed by the
same principles as tbhe relations between individuals (they are
'This provision was nullified by the eleventh amendment. In
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934), which in effect overruled
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1795), the Court held that a state
was not amenable to suit by an individual or foreign state without its
consent. The Court, therefore, in effect, construed the provision to
permit such suit when the state's consent has been given. If the consent were given and the Court entertained jurisdiction, then the Court
would proceed to exercise its judicial power in the same manner as in
other controversies subject to the judicial power. If, in deciding the

case, the Court deferred to the decisions of the state, the consent of
the state would be tantamount to a direction to the Court to act as the
supreme court of the consenting state, in other words, to abdicate its
judicial power.
'See review of the subject in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S.
313 (1934), note 38, supra.
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not necessarily so),40 the Supreme Court might find some precedent to rely upon in the law of the state which was applicable
to the particular relationship, as for example the law of State B,
if the contract were executed or to be performed there. But
in disposing of such matters the Court has never considered
itself bound by such local law.41 The Court has always disposed
of such cases under general legal principles as if it had com1
plete judicial power to decide the question, independently of the
local law. This cannot have been due to an oversight of the
Court. Or, was it? Is not the better explanation this: There
is no local law which can apply. State A cannot obtain jurisdiction over State B in the courts of A and, therefore, cannot
apply the law of- A. Moreover, by hypothesis, the contract
was consummated in B whose law would, under general principles of contract law, apply. But B cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent, which is only sparingly given. In
other words, the courts of B have no jurisdiction. Without
jurisdiction, they cannot possess the judicial power to dispose
of the controversy. Hence, there is no local law which is
applicable. The local law is suspended in vacuo. Ex necessitate,
the Supreme Court must take over the controversy and dispose
of it in accordance with its own principles of law.
The further fact that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction in such matters and that there can be no review
of its decision lends added support to the view that the Supreme
Court must dispose of the matter independently of any other
tribunal or system of law. Courts of simultaneous original and
final jurisdiction are complete entities in themselves and are
not subordinate to other courts or legal systems whether for
constitutional or any other reasons.
Again, suppose that State A, through its duly constituted
representatives, committed a trespass to the real property of
State B in that state. B adheres to the rule of Livingston, v.
Jefferson.42 The action is, according to the common law and the
law of B (as between individuals), local in nature. This rule
of law is a matter of substance. No recovery can be had unless
suit be brought in the courts of B. But B cannot there obtain
jurisdiction over A. Nevertheless, B may file suit for the
"Cf. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660, 670 (1931).
id.
I1Brack. 203, Fed. Cas. No. 8411 (1811).
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trespass in the Supreme Court. What law shall that court
apply? If bound by the comparable state law in similar circumstances, it cannot entertain jurisdiction, for the common
law rule affects the substantive rights of the two states; and in
fact, for this reason, the Court might perhaps decline jurisdiction. 43 It is extremely doubtful, however, that the Court
would take such a view and leave the state without any remedy.
In any situation involving the rule of Livingston v.
Jefferson,the practical effect is to deprive the victim of a remedy
for the trespass; and yet courts of states other than the state
where the trespass was committed decline jurisdiction. But
theoretically, the plaintiff may be able to obtain service on the
trespasser in the state of the trespass at some future time. This
can never be had between states. Hence, the Supreme Court
would be unwarranted in declining the jurisdiction which it had,
and would undoubtedly take jurisdiction of the matter and
apply its own law, evolved on the basis of common sense and
general legal principles.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting ambassadors. The constitutional provision means
exactly what it says. No other court can share that jurisdiction;
for if it did, it would either be a Supreme Court in that instance
from which there could be no review, or if there were review,
the Supreme Court would necessarily exercise appellate jurisdiction in the matter, in direct disregard of the Judiciary
Article. Suppose an ambassador, as an individual, committed
a tort or consummated a contract or had certain property rights
in State A. He may assert those rights and they may be
asserted against him in the Supreme Court exercising its
original jurisdiction. 4 4 If he were an ordinary individual, the
'In Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 (1939), the Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction in a controversy between states. The
opinion indicates that the Court believed it had jurisdiction or perhaps
that the Court would decide it had jurisdiction if it felt compelled to
do so. However, the Court also intimated that the District Court
would probably have jurisdiction of the controversy. Hence, if the
Supreme Court declined jurisdiction, the petitioner would not be
without that or some other available remedy.
" The Judiciary Article extends the judicial power to all cases
affecting ambassadors (Section 2(1)).

It provides that in all cases

affecting ambassadors, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction (Section (2)). As we are concerned with the plain meaning of

language and not with an incrustation of judicial lore or legislative

enactments which have been heaped upon such crystal clear language,
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law of A would govern his legal rights; and no doubt, apart
from treaty rights, the Supreme Court in disposing of the controversy would be strongly tempted to apply the law of A to
the cause. 45 But need it constitutionally do so ?
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over the
cause. There is no review of its decision. A court which thus
simultaneously exercises original and final jurisdiction is
ex necessitate independent of other courts and legal systems.
No other court can take jurisdiction of the matter. Hence, the
answer to the question would seem to be that the Supreme Court
need not apply the governing local law. Then, if the Court
need not apply the law of A, should it do so? The answer
here should likewise be in the negative, even though the Court
on independent grounds might be tempted to reach the same
result as other courts would in dealing with ordinary individuals.
Representatives of foreign governments have a particular
claim to the consideration of their legal relations by the national
courts. This claim is based upon the delicacy of the relations
of sovereign governments. And the claim is not only that the
national courts should assume jurisdiction of such matters,
but that they should give the question their full, independent
consideration, unfettered by the less exalted legal system of an
inferior 'sovereignty within the larger federal government.
A foreign nation would certainly not be satisfied to have the
legal relations of its accredited representative determined by
the courts of a government with which it had no relations and
to which its representatives were not accredited. A foreign
government would just as leave have its ambassador to this
country submit his grievances to or have his liability determined
by the courts of Mexico as by the courts of one of the states
of this Union.
it would seem obvious that the Judiciary Article contemplates the
assertion of such rights in the Supreme Court and not elsewhere; in
other words, that the provisions respecting the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court are self-executing, cannot be interfered with by
Act of Congress and that no other court can be entrusted with the
disposition of such causes. If Congress or the Supreme Court has
held otherwise, it would seem a clear violation of the unambiguous
language of the Constitution. See note 16, supra.
I That is, the Court might apply the decisions of the courts of A
without considering their soundness; or, it might defer to and reach
the same results as the courts of A in the same manner that it would
consider and appraise and perhaps follow the decisions of other
courts.
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This extreme sensitiveness and perhaps pomposity of
foreign governments may seem somewhat absurd to us at this
late day. But it seemed very real and a proper subject for
caution to thxe members of the Constitutional Convention.4"
Hamilton 47 even went so far as to suggest that if a foreign
government regarded the judgment of a state court against
one of its citizens (not necessarily a diplomatic representative)
as erroneous, it might be deemed "an aggression upon (the
foreigner's) sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations". A judgment
of a state court in a ease involving a foreign subject might be a
casus belli! Hence such causes were, by the Judiciary Article,
committed to the national courts; and they must decide such
causes in accordance with their own legal principles and not in
subordinacy to the courts of another sovereignty.
We come next to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. A collision between vessels may occur in navigable
waters of the United States which happen to be within the
jurisdiction of a state. In such a case, should the federal
courts, exercising admiralty jurisdiction, apply the law of
negligence, contributory negligence, intent, etc. which obtains
in the state in whose waters the collision occurred ?48 Or should
the federal courts apply their own admiralty law, irrespective
of the law of the state? The question has not often beeA dealt
with, because from the very existence of exclusive admiralty
"IInthe Popovici case, note 16, supra, the Court said (28 U. S. at
384): "It is true that there may be objections of policy to one of our
states intermeddling with the domestic relations of an official and
subject of a foreign power that conceivably might regard jurisdiction
as determined by nationality and not by domicil."
'The Federalist,No. LXXX (Lodge ed.) 496. Mr. Hu Williamson was of the opinion that in certain cases (e.g. fraudulent tender in
payment of debts) "the Courts of the offending State would probably
decide according to its own laws. The foreigner would complain and
the nation might be involved in war for the support of such dishonest measures. Is it not better to have a Court of Appeals in
which the Judges can only be determined by the laws of the
Nation?" See Warren, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 82, ftn. 78; see also note
81, infra.
'A similar collision, for example, between two canoes on a nonnavigable stream, would be governed by the law of the state and
would not be subject to admiralty jurisdiction. If the federal court
of admiralty failed to apply the state law, parties identically situated
would fare differently according to the jurisdictional forum in which

they could adjust their rights.
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jurisdiction in the federal courts 49 it has been assumed that the
ifederal courts alone are competent to decide such admiralty
questions and in doing so need not refer to the law of any
state. It is submitted that this assumption is correct. It accords
with the Judiciary Article's grant of judicial power in such
cases. It finds its warrant in no other provision of the
Constitution.
The Commerce Clause confers upon Congress certain
powers with respect to navigable waters. It likewise confers
upon Congress the same powers with respect to non-maritime
and non-navigable means of transportation in foreign and interstate commerce. But even as Congress does not possess legislative
power over the substantive legal rights of parties engaged in
non-maritime and non-admiralty interstate and foreign commerce, so it has no power over the substantive legal rights of
parties employing navigable and maritime means of transportation in interstate and foreign commerce. Nevertheless, the
federal courts do apply their own law in admiralty cases, and
the applicable state law in non-admiralty commerce cases.
Thus, where two steamers collide in Chesapeake Bay,
admiralty law is applied. Where two interstate trains collide
in State A, the law of A is applied. The reason for this
difference is that there is no provision of the Constitution
(except the Judiciary Article) which gives the federal government, either through Congress or the courts, power over the
substantive legal rights of parties in commerce whether of an
admiralty or a non-admiralty nature. The Judiciary Article,
however, gives the courts judicia power over all admiralty
causes but does not confer such power with respect to noradmiralty commerce. It is not, therefore, by virtue of a power
expressly delegated to Congress that federal courts exercise
full judicial power and complete independence in causes to
which their jurisdiction attaches. It is solely by virtue of the
grant of judicial power in the Judiciary Article. This is as
much an express delegation of complete power to the federal
courts as the bankruptcy, commerce or any other power is
expressly delegated to Congress. And for the same reason,
federal courts exercise complete independence in all matters
' Judicial Code, Section 256, amended, 28 U. S. C. A., § 371. But
see note 22, supra.
L. J.-3
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involving federal questions. To them is delegated the judicial
power in all cases involving the Constitution, laws and treaties.
Now, in the same way that we have discussed the Judiciary
Article's grant of judicial power in cases involving accredited
representatives of foreign governments, in admiralty and maritime cases, and in controversies between states, we might proceed
to discuss every instance of the grant of judicial power in the
Judiciary Article. Such a discussion, however, would merely
be cumulative and to no purpose. A sufficient number of
specific instances enables one to generalize as to all similar
instances. This brings us to the only reasonable conclusion
with respect to the scope and significance of the Judiciary
Article.
In that Article, the identical terms are employed to extend
the federal judicial power to all the cases and controversies
which it is made to cover as are employed to extend the
judicial power to federal matters, to cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, and to cases affecting ambassadors, etc.
Therefore, by a parity of reasoning, the grant of judicial
power which enables federal courts in the latter instances to
exercise complete independence of every other judicial system
and to completely decide and dispose of every matter within
their jurisdiction without resort or deference to any other
tribunal likewise enables the federal courts in all the other
matters to which the judicial power extends to exercise the
same independence and the same power df decision and
disposition of the cause. 50
It has been pointed out that, despite the above statement
and the fact that the grant of judicial power is the same in
all the cases mentioned in Article III, there is in fact this
difference: In the first three cases (federal matters, ambassadors, etc., admiralty), the judicial power extends to all cases,
whereas in the remaining cases, it extends only to cases, that is,
perhaps merely to some cases (or "Controversies", the term
See argument of Mr. Hu Williamson, notes 47, supra, and 81,
infra. He pointed out that just as federal courts were necessary in
order to guard against a violation of the national laws by the state
courts because the judges in the federal courts "can only be determined by the laws of the Nation", so federal courts were "equally to
be desired by the citizens of different states"-obviously because the
judges in those courts would be "determined by the laws of the
Nation" and not bound by the law of a particular state.
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employed in the Article). Should this difference affect the foregoing conclusion? The answer must be in the negative.
It is not the fact that the judicial power extends to all of
certain cases that gives the federal courts complete independence
in such matters. It is the fact that the courts have judicial
power over such causes. We have already seen that the judicial
power does not extend to all controversies between states. It
extends only to controversies between states. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court, exercising original and at the same time final
jurisdiction over such controversies, is independent of every
other tribunal and has power to dispose of the controverwies
without resort or deference to their decisions. It cannot, therefore, be that the independence and complete judicial power of
the federal courts depend upon the express extension of the
judicial power to all cases of the enumerated matters.
The extension of the judicial power to all of certain cases
renders the federal courts the repository of the judicial power
in all of those cases. They need not exercise it. They need not
even assume jurisdiction over all of the cases over which the
judicial power is conferred upon them; and they cannot exercise
the judicial power without first assuming jurisdiction. The
notable example is in respect of federal questions. The national
courts share their jurisdiction in these matters with the state
courts. To the extent that the latter share such jurisdiction,
they must exercise the federal judicial power to dispose of the
controversies. They exercise this power, not as state courts,
or as branches of a separate system of courts, but as federal
courts, as units in the federal judiciary. They are merely
lower courts in the federal system in the same manner that the
federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals are. They
are subject to direct review by the 'United States Supreme
Court. They exercise the full federal judicial power in the
same manner that, acting as state courts on state questions,
they exercise the full state judicial power. They need not
conform their decisions to those of the lower federal courts,
for they perform the same function as the latter. If they err
on a federal question, they are reversed and corrected by the
Supreme Court just as the Circuit Court of Appeals or District
Court is. Their decisions need not be reviewed by the Supreme
Court and often are not reviewed, with the result that on a
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federal question the judgment of a Supreme Court of a state
may be as important and persuasive an authority as the judgment of a Circuit Court of Appeals on the same question. In
the same manner, the state courts would exercise the federal
judicial power in cases of admiralty, ambassadors, etc., if they
were permitted to entertain jurisdiction over such causes. It is
the grant of judicial power and not its extension to all the
cases of a certain type that establishes the federal courts as
complete independent entities that need look to no other court
or judicial system for their course of decision.
Moreover, the grant of judicial power in Article III is
not comprehensive in some cases and expressly or impliedly
limited in others. It does not merely cover some controversies
between states, some controversies between citizens of different
states, etc. It extends to controversies in those and the other
instances. It covers all such controversies because it is not
limited in any respect and no controversies are excluded from
its operation. There would be no question of this if the Article
did not expressly extend the judicial power to a/I cases of three
classes (ambassadors, admiralty and federal questions). How,
then, should the difference in terminology be explained?
It may perhaps be explained as an effort to avoid the
constant repetition of "all" before the various controversies
enumerated. It is to be observed that this explanation is
probably applicable also to the failure to repeat "controversies"
before the remaining enumerated causes. But reliance should
not be placed entirely on such an explanation. The explanation
is rather cumulative and should be considered in connection
with and in support of an explanation that rests upon a firmer
foundation.
Such an explanation is to be found in the desire of the
Constitutional Convention to repose the decision of causes of
purely national concern in the federal courts and to leave other
matters, even though also pertaining in part to the national
interest and general welfare, to be disposed of as the courts
and Congress should see fit. In the latter matters, the Convention was not primarily interested, except to provide that the
federal judicial power should cover them. In the former, the
Convention was primarily interested and sought by all means
possible to avoid their being submitted to the state courts, which

Tim EIE CAsE
the Convention distrusted and suspected. 51 The fact that
Congress may not have shared this distrust and has actually
permitted the state courts to pass upon federal questions and
could permit them-to pass upon admiralty matters and causes
affecting ambassadors should not detract from the very evident
purpose of the Convention to remove these matters entirely
from the jurisdiction of the state courts and likewise from
their judicial power even though in dealing with such causes
they function as federal courts. Pursuant to this purpose,
the Convention made the judicial power expressly inclusive
and comprehensive as to three matters which were thought to be
of purely national concern 52 and only impliedly so, or perhaps
even distributive and limited, as to all other matters, even though
they partook largely of the nature of the national interest.
If neither of these explanations is correct (and it may be
that both of them fail to satisfy the student completely), then
we search in vain for a true explanation. This much, however,
is certain. The grant of judicial power to the federal courts in
Article III is not coextensive with, but is broader than, the
grant of legislative powers to the Congress and the delegation
of other powers to the executive. In admiralty and maritime
cases, the judicial power is plenary and authorizes the courts
completely to decide, resolve and dispose of all such causes.
This is an express delegation to the federal courts that finds
warrant in the Judiciary Article alone, and without reference
to or support from powers granted either to Congress or the
executive. The same is true with respect to the judicial power
in controversies between states, even though Article III does
not expressly extend that power to al controversies between
states, but merely to "controversies between states". And the
same is undoubtedly true with respect to cases involving
ambassadors and other public ministers, even though the
Supreme Court may have held that there is no federal jurisdiction over some causes affecting ambassadors, 53 and even though
the Court might be disposed to hold that in purely local or
state questions affecting ambassadors there is only jurisdiction
and not judicial power to deal with such cases. Article III is
I See note 63, infra.
"As to whether admiralty was deemed a matter of purely
national concern, see notes 22, supra, 56, 57, 78, infra.
I See note 16, supra.
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explicit in this respect and grants the federal courts plenary
power to decide and dispose of cases affecting ambassadors
without reliance upon or deference to any other judicial system.
This is a delegation of power to the courts which goes beyond
any delegation to either the legislative or executive branch of the
government.
This leads to a cardinal conclusion which the Court appears
to have overlooked in the Erie case. The federal government is
a government of strictly limited, delegated powers. But that
government consists of three separate and distinct branches,
the legislative, executive, and judicial. To each branch, certain
powers are expressly and others impliedly delegated. In some
respects, these separate powers and delegated authority are
parallel. In others, they overlap. In still others, they are
unrelated, incommensurable, or simply additional. Such an
additional or unrelated or perhaps even incommensurable power
is delegated to the federal courts by the Judiciary Article and
by that alone. The federal courts derive their authority from,
and the scope of their power must be determined by reference
to, that Article and not by reference to other delegations of
power to the Executive or Legislative Departments. The
Judiciary Article is a separate grant or delegation of power to
the third branch of the federal government, which branch is a
complete entity in itself, parallel and not subordinate to any
other branch of that government.
The reasoning of the court in the Erie case is, therefore,
unsound. The court argued that Congress could not pass a law
applicable to the affairs of a particular state. Ergo, the federal
courts cannot decide questions of state law independently of
the state courts. The premise of the Court, with, respect to
legislation by Congress, may or may not be right.54 But the
conclusion of the Court is a non sequitur for the reason that it
makes the scope and exercise of the judicial power coextensive
with and dependent upon the legislative authority, whereas, in
'During the writing of this article, there appeared an article
which takes issue with the premise of the Court in the Erie case and

reaches the same conclusion as this article. Walter F. Dodd, The De-

creasing Importance of State Lines (1941) 27 (No. 2) A. B. A. J. 78,
83. The author there says: " . . . but, in spite of the language of
the opinion, Congress has power to determine what law is applicable
in the federal courts . . . ." No authority is cited for this statement.
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fact, tne jucucial power is entirely distinct and derives from a
separate grant.5 5 And, once the fact is grasped that the
Judiciary Article is itself a grant or delegation of power, then
it is readily discerned that the judicial power is dependent
upon neither the legislative nor executive powers but is entirely
independent thereof. It depends upon, or is commensurate
with, those powers only to the extent that it is one of the many
grants in the Constitution and is useful or necessary in giving
full expression to those other grants. Beyond that, the judicial
power delegated to the courts by the Judiciary Article furnishes
its own raison d'gtre.
Since that is the nature of the Judiciary Article, it would
seem, both under the "necessary and proper clause" and the
"supreme law of the land clause", that Congress possesses
the power to legislate on matters within the judicial power
of the federal courts which are not otherwise within the express
or implied delegations of legislative power. Thus, since the
courts have the judicial power to determine controversies
between states, it would appear that Congress could legislate
on the substantive questions involved in such controversies.
And since the courts have the judicial power to determine
matters of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it would seem
that Congress could legislate on the substantive relations of
parties in such controversies. And the same would appear
true as to the other cases and controversies committed to the
judicial power of the federal courts.
But let us retrace our steps! We have seen that the
Judiciary Article extends the judicial power expressly to all
of three classes of cases and merely by implication to all of the
balance of the cases and controversies. If the latter observation
and explanation of the Judiciary Article is not correct, the
result would nevertheless be the same. That is to say, even if
the Article extended the judicial power to only some of the
remaining classes of controversies covered by the Article, the
'That the judicial power is not merely coextensive with the
legislative power appears from the fact that it is certainly coextensive with the executive power. See, e.g., Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935); United States v. Smith, 286 U. S. 6 (1932). In other
words, the judicial power is coextensive with the whole ambit of
constitutional power. And the judicial power is a constitutional
power, that is, the judicial power is coextensive with itself.
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power of the federal courts in dealing with those controversies
would be identical to what it is in the first three classes of cases.
The crux of the interlretation of the Article is in the fact that
the Article makes the judicial power extend to all of the various
matters in the identical language, even though all of some of
these matters are expressly designated and by implication only
some of the remaining controversies were brought within the
scope of the judicial power. Thus, the courts are vested with
judicial powers in diversity of citizenship, in land grant and
in other cases in the same way and in the identical language
that they are vested with judicial power over federal questions,
admiralty, and cases affecting ambassadors.
Now, in federal questions, admiralty and cases affecting
ambassadors, the courts have complete judicial power, not
because of other delegations of substantive power to the legislature but by reason of the Judiciary Article alone. For, if the
judicial power depended upon other grants of substantive power
to the legislature, then several things would follow. One: The
exercise of complete judicial power in matters in which the
federal courts are concededly independent of all other courts
and judicial systems (federal questions) would not depend upon
and, in fact, would be unrelated to the express extension of the
judicial power to all of those questions. It might just as well
be made to extend to only some of those questions. Two: Apart
from the Judiciary Article, the Constitution contains no grant
of power over substantive questions involved in admiralty and
maritime causes; and yet the federal courts exercise this power,
first by right, and second by necessity, since state courts do not
exercise admiralty jurisdiction. Third: Apart from the
Judiciary Article, the Constitution contains no grant over
substantive questions involved in controversies between states.
Here again the federal courts exercise this power, first by right,
and, second by necessity.
On the other hand, if the exercise of complete judicial
power depended upon the express extension of that power to all
of certain cases, the federal courts would possess the power in
cases affecting ambassadors but would not possess it in controversies between states. This would be anomalous, even apart
from the question of the- delicacy of international relations.
The state courts could act competently in the former matters,
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and might well be entrusted with their decision; but the state
courts are hopelessly unable to cope with the latter causes
without the express consent of a defendant state.
Furthermore, the history of admiralty jurisdiction in this
country renders such an explanation untenable. We know, for
example, that for at least three years after the adoption of the
Constitution, some state courts exercised admiralty jurisdiction.56
And we may assume, from the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, that they likewise possessed and exercised full judicial
power in such matters. Certainly, there is no evidence that
during this period the federal courts deemed it inconsistent
with their authority that the state courts should decide
admiralty matters in accordance with their own admiralty law,
whether derived from the Civil Law, the Admiralty Law of
Great Britain or simply evolved by themselves in the course of
decision. And Hamilton took it for granted that state courts of
admiralty were entirely independent of the federal courts in such
causes. 57 As the Supreme Court clearly indicated in the
Manro case, 5 8 it was an act of Congress and not the Constitution
which deprived the states of this jurisdiction in admiralty and
consequently their judicial power or independence of the
federal courts in such matters.
Hence, it is not the extension of the judicial power to all
admiralty cases that gives the federal vourts complete judicial
power to dispose of admiralty questions within their jurisdiction.
It is the fact that the judicial power is made to extend to
admiralty (not all admiralty) cases that gives the federal courts
"Manro v. Joseph Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473, 490 (1825); see note

22, supra.

",The Federalist, No. LXXXIII (Lodge ed.) 524-525.

In his dis-

cussion of the pre-existing (i.e., prior to the Constitution) relation of
state and national admiralty courts, Hamilton assumes that the same

relationship will continue under the Constitution, and that neither the

Judiciary Article nor any other provision of the Constitution will
affect or necessitate a change in this relationship. Thus, he takes it
for granted that in Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, New York,

Virginia and the Carolinas there will continue to be admiralty courts,
side by side with those of the national government; whereas in New
Jersey and Connecticut and perhaps in Georgia, admiralty will be

administered by the states in their common law courts. He assumes
that after the adoption of the Constitution, admiralty causes will be
tried to the federal courts no matter where they sit and likewise in
states, like New York, having separate admiralty courts the cause will
be tried to the court; but in states like Connecticut and New Jersey,
the cause will be tried by jury.
" See notes 56 and 22, supra.
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their independence in such matters. So far as the Constitution
and the Judiciary Article are concerned, this power may be
shared by or reposed equally in other judicial systems. It
requires an act of Congress to restrict the exercise of that power
to the federal courts. And it is only this latter power of
restriction or attenuation that can be ascribed to or derived
from the grant of judicial power in all admiralty cases.
Thus, the independence of the federal courts of all other
judicial systems in completely deciding and disposing of cases
within their jurisdiction depends upon and derives from the
grant of judicial power in the Judiciary Article. It does not
derive from any other delegated power in the Constitution;
and it does not derive from the extension of the judicial power
to all of the cases subject to that power. The Judiciary Article
is itself a delegation or grant of power; and under it the federal
courts exercise their power. Since that power is made to extend
in identical language to a number of cases and controversies,
the power of the courts in all of those cases and controversies
must be the same. That is, it must be the full judicial power
to decide and dispose of all such causes independently and
without resort or deference to the decisions of any other
tribunal or judicial system. Concededly, this is true of federal
questions and admiralty matters. Ex necessitate, it must be true
of controversies between states. And in cases affecting
ambassadors, in controversies to which the United States is a
party, in diversity of citizenship cases, in land grant controversies, in controversies between a state and citizens of another
state, and in controversies between a state or its citizens and
foreign states, its citizens or subjects, it must also be true.
It may be unfortunate that the federal courts possess this
power in all such cases. But it cannot be denied them without
distorting the true, plain meaning of the Judiciary Article.
In some cases and controversies covered by the Judiciary
Article, the federal courts must be deemed to be entirely
independent and to possess complete judicial power to the
exclusion of all other judicial systems. This would be true of
federal questions and would follow from the "supreme law
of the land" clause. In other cases, the federal courts, while
possessing the power, may nevertheless share it with, state courts
possessing the same power. Such are admiralty matters and
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cases affecting ambassadors. An act of Congress has made the
judicial power of the federal courts exclusive in the former
instance and could do likewise in respect of cases affecting
ambassadors. 59 In the remaining controversies covered by the
Judiciary Article, federal and state courts must share and
exercise their judicial power equally, applying it to those causes
which come within their jurisdiction. If the Judiciary Article
be construed as impliedly extending the judicial power to all of
these controversies, then, as in cases of admiralty, an act of
Congress could render this power exclusive in the federal
courts. If, on the other hand, the Article be construed as
extending the power only to some of the enumerated controversies, it would appear that the judicial power would forever
have to be shared by the federal courts with the state courts
and that Congress possess no authority to vest such power
exclusively in the federal courts.
It is unnecessary and perhaps premature-certainly unnecessary so far as the thesis of this paper is concerned-to express.
a preference for either of the latter possible interpretations
of the Article. But this conclusion is inescapable, that the
federal courts in the enumerated cases and controversies possess
judicial power, and that that power renders them entirely
independent of all other courts and judicial systems. This
independence may be exclusive of such other courts and systems
or it may be joint or in common with them, with the result that
they too possess a like power. In the absence of an act of
Congress, the latter alternative represents the relation of
federal and state courts in diversity of citizenship cases. Unlike
the act of Congress which vested the judicial power in admiralty
cases exclusively in the federal courts, an act of Congress has
intervened which has deprived the federal courts of their
judicial power in diversity of citizenship cases. This is the
Rules of Decision Act which imposes a limitation on the
diversity of citizenship clause of the Judiciary Article. Without
that Act, the federal courts could exercise the full extent of
their judicial power in diversity of citizenship cases and would
be entirely independent of the state courts. They would evolve
their own principles of law under the influence and tradition
of the common law and would apply those principles irrespective
" See note 16, supra.
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of and without deference to the state courts. An enabling act
of Congress might, on the oth.er hand, lay down a set of substantive principles of law and thus establish the law which the
federal courts, should follow in such cases.60 All of this is
inherent in the Judiciary Article.
Now, this paper set out to demonstrate that the decision
of the court in the Erie case as a constitutional question is
unsound. Many arguments have been advanced in support
of that thesis. These arguments are all cumulative. If any
one of them should fall or seem untenable, the thesis itself
would remain established; for any one of the many arguments
advanced in favor of it would seem sufficient to support it.
We might, therefore, terminate the paper at this point and,
as in the case of a geometric theorem, mark it Q. E. D.
But we should not rest content with such a conclusion.
The importance of the question impels a consideration of all
available data in support of the conclusion. Up to this point,
we have merely dealt with the internal evidence in the Judiciary
Act and the Constitution which inescapably lead to the conclusion. By analogy to a study of ancient documents, we may
say that the whole of the discussion up to this point has been
a sort of constitutional exegesis or hermeneutics. In order to
ascertain the true scope and meaning of both the Rules of
Decision Act and the Judiciary Article, we have relied entirely
upon the evidence furnished by those two documents alone.
In order to make the discussion complete and to support, if
possible, the conclusion from every angle, an examination of
other documents and a consideration of external evidence in
support of the thesis become imperative. We therefore turn
to a discussion of such evidence.
Having ascertained that the diversity of citizenship clause
of the Judiciary Article renders the federal courts entirely
independent of the state courts in such matters, we naturally
inquire whether, in view of the delegated, limited nature of the
national government and the sharp separation of the powers
of the states and the federal government, there was any justification for this broad grant to the federal courts; whether the
conferring of this independent power on the federal courts
in state questions was conscious and deliberate or was perhaps
" See note 54, supra and notes 79, 86, 88, infra.
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an oversight. If it were the latter, then despite the internal
evidence furnished by both the Judiciary Act and the Judiciary
Article we should perhaps be warranted in saying that the
decision in the Erie case is in harmony with the spirit of the
Constitution. Such a conclusion would perhaps be justified on
the theory that the Constitution creates a government of purely
delegated powers, that such delegated powers are intended to
cover only matters of national concern, and that in the absence
of an express or necessarily implied delegation of power
applicable to the local affairs of a state all powers not expressly
or impliedly delegated are reserved to the states. As has been
pointed out, such a conclusion would ignore the fact that the
Judiciary Article itself should be deemed an express grant,
that the judiciary constitutes a third, coequal branch of the
federal government and that delegations of authority to that
branch are as proper as to the other two branches. Nevertheless,
if such a delegation of authority in the Judiciary Article should
prove to have been unintentional, the result of carelessness
and palpably inconsistent with the theory and purpose of the
Constitution, we should perhaps be waranted or even induced
to disregard it. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to
ascertain the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in
inserting the diversity of citizenship clause into the Judiciary
Article.
When the members of the Constitutional Convention came
to the consideration of a judiciary to enforce the national laws,
a sharp division of opinion was to be observed among them.
The anti-nationalists could find no excuse for the creation of a
separate system of courts. They felt that the national laws and
the authority conferred by the Constitution would be amply safeguarded by the courts of the several states. 61 They were willing

I The various plans for a Constitution which were originally proposed to the Convention, except the Hamilton plan, dealt rather summarily with the judiciary. In all the plans except that proposed by
Hamilton, the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary was either made
appellate over the state courts or where the federal judiciary was
given original jurisdiction it was limited to a very few specified
matters, such as impeachment of national officers, collection of
national revenues, punishment of piracies and felonies on the high
seas, etc., and in general to matters affecting the national peace and
harmony. See Journal of The Debates, U. S. Constitutional Convention 1787 (ed. Hunt, Putnam 1908) (referred to as Journal of
Debates) pp. 17 (Randolph plan), 29 (Pinclmey plan), 136 (Report
of Committee of Whole on Randolph plan), 141 (Paterson plan), 163
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to permit review of the decisions of the state courts on questions
of purely national concern by a single national tribunal, a
supreme court, which might perhaps also be entrusted with a
very limited original jurisdiction in such matters as impeachment. Members of the Convention who were of this frame of
mind, of course, did not persuade the Convention, as our whole
structure of federal courts testifies.
Opposed to this group of anti-nationalists were the
moderates, men who were willing to compromise and embody
in the Constitution the theory and practice of both federalism
and nationalism, and the strong nationalists. These two groups
prevailed, at least with respect to the judiciary, as the creation
of federal courts manifests. On many matters, some essential
and some of minor significance, they differed among themselves.
But on perhaps three points they were agreed: 1. "An effective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority
62
was essential" to enforce the national laws and authority.
2. The courts of the states, although theoretically capable of
serving this purpose, were utterly incompetent, untrustworthy
and "The willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans
of their masters" (the state legislatures). 63 Incompetence,
(Hamilton plan). In commenting on the two principal and fundamentally different plans (Randolph and Paterson), Wilson said:
"11. In one (Randolph) the jurisdiction of national tribunals to
extend, etc. -; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other
(Paterson). 12. Here (Randolph) the jurisdiction is to extend to all
cases affecting the National peace and harmony; there (Paterson) a
few cases only are marked out" (Journal of Debates 147). Luther
Martin opposed the creation of any inferior federal tribunals, because "they will create jealousies and oppositions in the State Tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere" (Journal of
Debates 389). Mr. Sherman "was willing to give the power to the
Legislature (to appoint inferior tribunals) but wished them to make
use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be done with safety to
the general interest" (Journal of Debates 389).
" Madison, Journal of Debates 82; Ghorum, id., 389; The Federalist (Lodge ed.) No. LXXX, 497: ". . . every government ought
to possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own
authority . .. .
"Madison: "Confidence cannot be put in the State Tribunals as
guardians of the National authority and interests. In all the States
these are more or less dependent on the Legislatures. In Georgia
they are appointed annually by the Legislature. In Rhode Island the
Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature who would be the
willing instruments of the wicked and arbitrary plans of their
masters" (Journal of Debates 373). Randolph: (observed) "that the
Courts of the States cannot be trusted with the administration of the
National laws" id. 389). Hamilton: "The Courts of neither of the
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venality, instability and dependence on the whims and wickedness of their masters, the legislatures! The courts of the states
did not elicit the respect of those members of the Convention
who prevailed with respect to the judiciary. 3. But even if
they had merited their respect, an inducement to create a
national judiciary would still have presented itself in the fact
that at this early stage of union and confederation, the policy
64
of the states and nation was apt to be diametrically opposed.
The local policy, as it found expression in the courts of the states,
would often clash with, the policy of the nation; and it would,
therefore, be improper to entrust the decision of questions of
national concern to the state courts.
The first of these observations would, alone have been
sufficient to warrant the establishment of a federal judiciary.
The repeated pronouncement of the other reasons discloses a
granting states could be expected to be unbiased. The laws may have
even prejudged the question, and tied the courts down to decisions
in favor of grants of the state to which they belonged. And even
where this had not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as
men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own government" (The Federalist, No. LXXX, Lodge ed., 498). See also
argument of Hu Williamson, note 47, supra.
This distrust of the state courts, which must have continued in
the first Congress, may account for the failure of the Rules of Decision
Act to require the federal courts to follow the state law in equity
cases. The distrust of the Convention was directed to the courts, that
is, the judges of the states and not to the juries which decided questions of fact "in the trials at common law". It was probably believed
by the Convention and the first Congress that a jury of twelve men,
no matter how incompetent its individual members might be, would
come to a correct conclusion on issues of fact. It only remained then
for the judge to apply the law to a verdict thus reached; and a patently venal or erroneous judgment based upon such a verdict could be
readily corrected. Hence, the federal courts could be charged with
applying in a diversity case the decisions of the state courts in common law causes, where the state merely applied the law to an issue
of fact correctly determined. But where the judge determined the
issues of fact in an equity case, his venality and incompetence were
apt not only to lead to an erroneous decree after the decision of the
question of fact but were likewise apt to produce a thoroughly
unsound decision on the disputed question of fact. As his decision on
the facts carried considerable weight, Congress no doubt felt it was
less likely to be corrected, on appeal, than an erroneous judgment
would be on writ of error in a common law case. Hence, decisions
of the state courts in equity cases were more distrusted than those in
common law matters; and Congress may for this reason have left the
federal courts free to use their independent judgment in deciding
equity cases.
'See Luther Martin, note 61, supra; Hamilton, note 63, supra;
Randolph: "The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often place
the general and local policy at variance" (Journal of Debates 373).
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deep-rooted distrust of the state courts; and this distrust and
suspicion resulted in the Convention's entrusting to the federal
courts through the Judiciary Article matters that do not superficially appear to be of national concern (e.g., controversies
between citizens of different states, land grant controversies,
controversies between a state and citizens of another state, etc.).
The diversity of citizenship clause can be accounted for on this
ground and on this alone.65
The federalists and anti-nationalists, of course, contended
that review of the state courts in such controversies by the
Supreme Court or by a single federal appellate tribunal would
answer all the objections of the nationalists to the entrusting
of such causes to the state courts. But the prevailing temper of
the Convention was too hostile to the state courts to permit of
such a solution of the problem.
We have just said that the Judiciary Article extends the
federal judicial power to many matters which appear to be of
purely local concern. Actually, it is preferable to regard the
matter in a different light. Either the Convention regarded
these matters as of national concern and relating to the general
welfare, or they in fact became matters of national concern and
interest by being incorporated into and covered by the Judiciary
66
Article.
The Convention no doubt reasoned that in diversity of
citizenship cases involving purely local questions, it was essential
that the non-resident should receive an impartial administration
of justice and that he should obtain the decision of an unbiased
tribunal competent to pass upon his case. But knowing the
state tribunals as they thought they did, they regarded such an
'What is said of the diversity of citizenship clause is, for the
most part, equally applicable to the other clauses in the Judiciary
Article which bear no relation to delegated legislative or executive
powers but relate solely to the powers of the judiciary. And what is
true of those clauses is equally applicable to the diversity clause. As
we are concerned, however, only with the Erie case and the diversity
clause, our observations are confined largely to that clause. The
point here made is that the diversity clause can be explained first,
because the Convention deemed diversity jurisdiction a matter of
national concern, second, because they mistrusted the state courts, and
third, because they regarded it as impossible for local judges even

when not venal and incompetent to be wholly impartial to nonresidents.
See, Art. V, Sec. 1 of Hamilton plan (Journal of Debates 171);
Proposal of Madison with reference to 13th Resolution (id. 389);

Remarks of Representative Nicholson in 7th Congress, note 75, infra.
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objective as utterly unobtainable in the state courts. The state
courts were incompetent and too venal to deal properly even
with controversies between their own citizens. That, coupled
with what was believed to be a vicious hostility of the states
toward non-residents,6 7 made it highly undesirable to put such
non-residents at the mercy of the local courts. Of course, if the
non-resident voluntarily submitted to the local jurisdiction, his
interests ceased to be of national concern. But if he resisted
the local jurisdiction, his case became a subject of the national
concern and general welfare. The Convention felt bound to
protect him both against incompetency and against local
hostility to "foreigners".
Arguing against and logically destroying Hamilton's
argument that the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was
essential to preserve the privileges and immunities of nonresidents, 8 the federalists and anti-nationalists claimed that the
problem could be solved by affording a federal review of the
state court decisions. But the Convention desired soundness
of decision in the first instance, no doubt to relieve the burden
of such procedure on the federal reviewing court and no doubt
likewise to guard against errors which could not be corrected
on such review because of the nature of appellate review and
its dependence upon the record made in the court of first
instance. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that what the
Convention sought was soundness of decision in the first instance.
And it was for this reason that federal courts were created
and for this reason that their judicial power was made to extend
to matters that would otherwise seem of purely local concern.
Soundness of decision in the federal courts could be obtained
only if they were liberated from all dependence on the state
courts. This was, of course, taken for granted in cases involving
federal questions, i.e., matters arising from the exercise of
delegated powers. But it was also inherent in the grant of
judicial power over controversies which became of national
concern only because th.ey were entrusted to the federal courts
in the Judiciary Article. In other words, the federal courts in a
diversity case could administer consummate justice only if they
could dispose of the matter in accordance with their own under" See remarks of Luther Martin, note 61, supra; Hamilton, note
63, supra; Randolph, note 64, supra; Hu Williamson, note 47, supra.
"The Federalist, No. LXXX, 498.
L. J.-4
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standing of the applicable law and without deference to the
decisions of state courts in similar matters. The state courts
were not to be trusted with the decision of such questions even
between their own citizens. They were venal, incompetent,
subject to the whims of the legislature and subject to removal
at the pleasure of the law makers. Surely they could not be
entrusted with passing upon the interests of "foreigners".
And in neither of the matters could their decisions serve as a
guide to the federal courts in disposing of matters within the
federal judicial power. The federal courts had to remain free,
and unfettered by the errors and pitfalls in the decisions of the
state courts. Independence of decision, i.e., full exercise of the
judicial power, was thus the quintessence of the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction by the federal courts.
The Convention was undoubtedly as aware as we are today
of the nature of judicial action. Courts decide cases on the
basis of precedent. If none exists at the time of decision, they
create a precedent by that decision. This precedent is binding
as to all future controversies which come within its tenor.
If they have established a precedent in a controversy between
their own citizens, it will govern a similar one subsequently
arising between citizens of different states. Per contra, a
precedent established in a diversity case will bind citizens of
the same state subsequently presenting an analogous controversy. Even venal and incompetent courts and those subject
to the pleasure of a wicked legislature act in this manner. Even
a court that accepts bribes or is for other reasons moved to act
not impartially will adhere to the principle of precedents but
will find means of distinguishing them or distorting the facts
in order to avoid their binding effect. Or, a court that is hostile
to "foreigners" might simply overrule a precedent once settled
in favor of its own citizens. And, when the question again arose
between citizens of the same state, the court might overrule
its overruling decision and return to the law established by the
overruled decision. If such judicial maneuvering were apparent,
the "privileges and immunities" clause would undoubtedly
afford a remedy; and review by the Supreme Court would
correct any injustice to "foreigners".
But, in numerous instances, because of the nature of
appellate review and the inherent right of courts to overrule
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and re-overrule their decisions,6 9 there would be no remedy
against such unjudicial action. Hence, the Convention did
not deem it wise to commit the causes of non-residents to
tribunals which they inherently distrusted unless the nonresidents themselves should submit to their jurisdiction. And
in conferring upon the federal courts judicial power over such
controversies, the Convention naturally intended to free them
of dependence upon the state courts whose decisions they
regarded as inept, unsound and thoroughly untrustworthy.
It should thus be clear that the Convention intended and
deliberately provided in the Judiciary Article that in all matters
therein entrusted to the federal judicial power the federal courts
should exercise complete independence of decision and should
dispose of all controversies within their jurisdiction in accordance with their own sense of justice and what they deemed to
be the controlling principles of jurisprudence, unfettered by the
decisions of any other tribunal or system of courts than their
own ultimate reviewing tribunal. If there were any doubt at
all about this, it would have to be resolved in favor of the thesis
here advanced, in view of the contemporary and other evidence
which we shall proceed to examine.
Paterson, as we have seen, was a strong anti-nationalist.
He proposed a federal, strongly anti-national plan for a Constitution. Nevertheless, in the fifth Article or Resolution of his
plan, he proposed that the federal "judiciary so established shall
have authority to hear and determine .. .by way of appeal in
the dernier resort . . . in all cases in which foreigners may be
interested . . . . ,,7o Paterson undoubtedly realized that cases
in which foreigners are interested might involve only local
questions of state law. He was nevertheless willing to entrust
such cases to ultimate disposition by the federal judiciary on
appeal. It is inconceivable that he intended to bind the federal
reviewing court on state questions in such appeals by the decision
of the highest state court. If that were his intention, review by
the federal court would be purposeless and of no avail. When he
proposed review of the decisions of state court in matters
involving foreigners, he intended that the "supreme tribunal"
should have full power and authority not only to hear the appeal
" Cf. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., U. S. Sup. Ct.
No. 141, Oct. Term, 1940, Jan. 6, 1941.
Journal of Debates, 1941.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

but also to "determine" the governing substantive law, i.e., to
establish the controlling legal principle to be applied. The
clause in the Paterson plan relating to foreigners, if not the
forerunner, is the equivalent or counterpart of the present
clause extending the judicial power "(to controversies) between
a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or
subjects"1
Hamilton entertained a like interest in litigation involving
foreigners. In suggesting amendments to the Randolph plan,
he proposed a clause similar to the one proposed by Paterson.
"This court to have . . . an appellative jurisdiction in all
causes in which . . . the Citizens of foreign Nations are
72
concerned."
His own, more elaborate plan, which he proposed as a
substitute for the several other plans tendered to the Convention,
contained a substantially identical clause to that in the Paterson
plan, and also a clause relating to diversity of citizenship cases.
His language is: "The Supreme Court shall have . . . an
appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact in all cases which
shall concern the citizens of foreign nations, in all questions
between the citizens of different states, and in all others in which
the fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved, subject
to such exceptions as are herein contained and to such regulations
as the Legislature shall provide" (italics supplied) .3
Hamilton thus proposed ultimate review of purely state
questions in diversity cases by the Supreme Court, which in
such matters must fix and settle the applicable law and could
not be bound by the decision of the court which it was reviewing.
And, in the clause containing the exception, he laid the foundation for the Rules of Decision Act. The Legislature was to be
entrusted with power to restrict the review and thus to impose
a limitation upon the exercise of the judicial power in such
matters. The Legislature might, for example, provide that on
all state questions the Supreme Court should regard the decisions
of the state courts as "rules of decision".
Hamilton thus clearly regarded diversity cases and other
matters wholly unrelated to delegaied legislative powers as
'For a discussion of this provision of Article III, see Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934); also see notes 38, 46, supra.
' Journal of Debates 163.
7'id., 171.
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involving fundamental constitutional, i.e., national, questions.
Madison, and, in fact, the entire Convention were of the same
opinion. They distinguished matters involving delegated legislative powers from other matters concerning the national welfare.
Madison proposed: "that the jurisdiction (of the National
Judiciary) shall extend to all cases arising under the national
laws; and to such other questions as may involve the national
peace and harmony' ". 4 This was agreed to by the Convention,
"nem. con.", i.e., without dissent.
Representative Nicholson, a leading anti-federalist, fifteen
years later expressed the same opinion. In the debate over the
repeal of the Adams Circuit Court Act of 1801 he said: "...
it was rightly judged that (the judicial power of the federal
courts) should not extend to any other cases of judicial cognizance than those which might be deemed somewhat of a
general nature and whose importance might affect the general
character or general welfare of the nation".5 He knew, of
course, that the Judiciary Article contained a diversity of
citizenship clause and other clauses having no relation to the
national legislative power. Yet he considered these matters
"somewhat of a general nature" and as affecting the general
character or general welfare of the nation.
Naturally, if these matters were of national concern and of
importance to the general welfare, in a constitutional sense
they are within the unlimited judicial power of the federal
courts; and those courts must, therefore, dispose of such causes
in accordance with their own rules of law and without reliance
upon the decisions of any other tribunal.
Both by the Judiciary Article and the First Article of the
Constitution, Congress was given the power to ordain and
establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. TlIe power to
create a court necessarily implies the power to determine not
only its rules of practice and procedure but likewise the substantive rules of law that are to shape its decisions.7 6 The
parallel existence of two or more courts or judiciaries necessarily
assumes the existence of two or more systems of jurisprudence
which those courts may adopt and incorporate into their
"id., 389.
7th Cong., Ist Sess., Feb. 26, 1802; see Warren 37 Harv. L. Rev.
49, 53.
"See following discussion.
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decisions.7 7 The creation of equity, admiralty and probate
courts in England, side by side with the common law courts,
not only automatically removed the matters dealt with, by such
courts from the jurisdiction of the common law courts, but also
rendered inapplicable to them the principles of the common
78
law which were enforceable in the common law courts.
Similarly, the existence, side by side, of federal and state courts
necessarily implies the existence of two systems of jurisprudence
that may be adopted and enforced in these respective courts.
This would seem inevitably so if the Supreme Court had not,
without any argument or citation of authority, declared the
contrary. But undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution,
their contemporaries and the early expounders of the Constitution were in a better position to interpret the Constitution
than these latter day jurists.
Winthrop, for example, in his "Letters of Agrippa" says :79
' What is meant is that each system of courts would develop its
own jurisprudence. Thus, in dealing with a case between A and B,
the court of a state may decide that x = y. That is the jurisprudence
of the state. The federal court in dealing with an identical controversy might decide either that x = y or that x = z. Either decision
would be the jurisprudence of the federal court. Its agreement with
the court of the state would be incidental or accidental rather than
under any compulsion of statute or inherent limitation in the federal
judicial power. Courts functioning in this manner are truly coordinate courts and not parts of an integrated system of courts. See
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 110 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A.
6th, 1940), rev'd. U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 141, Oct. Term 1940, Jan. 6, 1941.
" In this country, at least during the period of the Confederation
and for a time even after the adoption of the Constitution, the situation was extremely confused. Some states had common law, chancery, probate and admiralty courts. Others had only some of these,
for example, common law and chancery or common law and probate.
In still others, there was only a single common law court which dealt
with common law, equity, admiralty and probate matters. What law
was applied it is difficult to determine with absolute certainty. But it
is certain that when the subject matter of what we understand to
be a particular jurisdiction, such as probate or admiralty, was disposed of by the court of another jurisdiction, such as common law or
chancery, the practice and procedure and, it is fair to say, the substantive law of the latter court governed. Thus in New Jersey,
admiralty and probate causes were triable by jury. In Georgia, all
causes were triable by jury and were appealable from the general
jury to a special jury. In Connecticut, chancery and admiralty matters were triable by jury. In general, see The Federalist, No.
LXXXIII (Lodge ed.) 524-526. After the adoption of the Constitution the Pennsylvania common law courts (there were no equity
courts) enforced equitable remedies but generally applied the principles of the common law. See Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425 (1799).
Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 11, 14, 1787; see Warren, op. cit.
37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 84.
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"Causes of all kinds between citizens of different states are to
be tried before the Continental Court. The court is not bound
to try it according to the local laws where the controversies
happen; for in that case it may as well be tried in the state
court. The rule which is to govern the new courts must therefore
be made by the court itself, or by its employees, the Congress.
. .. Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for trying
all kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of
.
The right to appoint such courts necesdifferent states.
sarily involves in it the right to defining their powers and
determining the rules by which their judgment shall be regulated . .. It is vain to tell us that a maxim of common law
required contracts to be determined by the law existing where the
contract was made; for it is also a maxim that the legislature
has the right to alter the common law."
Winthrop thus not only thought that federal courts under
the Constitution had the power to apply a different law in
diversity cases from that enforced in the state courts; but he
also believed they would and should exercise this power.
No less enlightening are the remarks of Representative
Nicholas of Virginia in opposing a proposed change in the
Circuit Court Act of 1801.80 " 'He stated that the estate of
Lord Fairfax, with the quit rents due thereon, had been confiscated . . .; notwithstanding the confiscation, the heirs of
Lord Fairfax bad sold all their rights, which the assignees
contended remained unimpaired. It might be their wish to
prosecute in a Federal Court, expecting to gain advantages in
it which could not be had from the courts of Virginia. His
object was to defeat the purpose by limiting the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court to sums beyond the amount of quit rents
alleged to be due by any individual.'"
This purpose of Representative Nicholas to employ the
courts in behalf of or against a particular individual or group
may not be consonant with our understanding of and reverence
for th.e judiciary. But it discloses beyond all peradventure
that he believed the federal courts possessed the power and
would, in fact, apply a different rule of law than that obtaining
in the state courts. And these remarks were made twelve years
after the enactment of the Rules of Decision Act! The fact
"6th Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 7, 1801; see Warren, op. cit. 78.
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that his views prevailed indicates that they must have bad some
influence on the sixth Congress.
Mr. Hu Williamson, one of the signers of the Constitution,
favored the diversity jurisdiction under the Third Article
because it gave a superior remedy against iniquitous and unconstitutional state paper money, legal tender and stay laws. "Is it
not better", he said,81 "to have a Court of Appeals in which
the judges can only be determined by the laws of the nation?"
And then he says: "This court is equally to be desired by
citizens of different states." Why? The answer is found in
his first statement: because the federal court will apply its own
law, the law of the nation.
Mr. Justice Paterson was an anti-nationalist. In the convention, he wanted to limit the jurisdiction of the federal
82
courts more than was proposed in the Randolph plan.
Nevertheless, when on the bench in 1796, i.e., seven years after
the enactment of the Rules of Decision Act, he said during
the course of an argument, when it was urged that Section 34
of the Judiciary Act required the federal court to apply the
law of Rhode Island: "I shall certainly consider myself bound
in some cases by the practice of the state courts. "83 Apparently
he did not feel bound to follow the state practice in all cases.
At the same argument, Mr. Justice Chase refused to consider the common law of the state as binding upon the federal
court. He said: "I shall be governed in forming my opinion
by what the common law says must be the effect of a judgment
by default; without regarding the practice of the state. If indeed
the practice of the several states were in every case to be
adopted, we should be involved in an endless labyrinth of false
constructions, and idle forms. "84
In the same case, the defendant in error was represented
by Mr. Mifflin, a signer of the Constitution from Pennsylvania,
which, it should be remembered, had proposed a plan which
would have required the federal courts to follow the state courts
both in substance and practice.8 5 At the argument, he and his
co-counsel assumed and apparently entertained no doubt that
" Warren, op. cit. 82, ftn. 78; see note 47, supra.
'Journal of Debates 121, 136, 141, 147; see note 31, supra.
' Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 343, 346, ftn. 1 (1796).

referred not only to procedure but also to substantive law.
id.

The Federalist, No. LXXXIII (Lodge ed.) 528.
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Congress had power to project its own system of jurisprudence
in contradistinction to that of the several states.8 6 They contended for the application of the Rules of Decision Act to
common law questions solely as a matter of convenience and to
avoid the discontent and perplexity that a novel system of
jurisprudence might have engendered. They assumed that the
Rules of Decision Act was a limitation on the Judiciary Article
and they regarded it as salutary and expedient. They apparently
regarded it as a restriction on the federal judicial power because
of legislative fiat and not because of any inherent limitation in
87
the constitutional grant of power.
Half a century later, the case of Swift v. Tyson, now
relegated to the limbo of antiquarian curiosities, was decided.
The Court, of course, as their decision reveals, entertained no
doubt of the power of the courts under the Judiciary Article to
enforce a federal system of jurisprudence and decline to follow
the law of the states. They may have erred in the construction
of the Rules of Decision Act as not applying to the commo~n
law of a state, and the Court in the Erie case has so held. Buit
their assumption and exercise of an independent judicial power
is significant.
Even more significant is the argument of Mr. Dana,
unsuccessful counsel, in that case. He urged upon the Court
the construction of the Rules of Decision Act which was adopted
by the Court in the Erie case. But he regarded it as a limitation
on the Judiciary Article rather than as declaratory thereof.
""But, on the other hand, it is obvious that any project for a
general system of jurisprudence; coextensive with the union, could

only have engendered discontent, and must have been abortive. To
have attempted a theory of law and practice entirely novel, would

have occasioned endless perplexity; and to have superceded(sic) the
settled practice of some states, in order to introduce the practice of
others; to compel, for instance, the lawyers of Massachusetts to study
and enforce the practice of the lawyers of South Carolina, would have
occasioned endless jealousy and inconvenience. From these considerations the Congress wisely enacted" the Rules of Decision Act.
3 Dall. at 352.
"In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the Circuit
Court because of the construction given to the laws of Rhode Island

by the courts of that state. Mr. Justice Chase, however, "observed
that he concurred in the opinion of the Court; but that it was on
common law principles, and not in compliance with the laws and
practice of the state." 3 Dall. at 356, ftn. 2. Query: Can Mr. Justice
Chase at that early date have been so dead wrong or so utterly dis-

regardful of Congressional legislation as to the compulsion of the
Rules of Decision Act in common law matters?
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He said: "To have attempted to create a code of laws by
legislative enactment would have been without present avail
to the courts; and even with the aid of future experience and
after years of labor could not be expected to be perfect." 88
He thus was certain that Congress had the power to create such
a code of laws. But he pointed out that Congress had preferred
the course required by the Rules of Decision Act because of its
expediency and the cumbersomeness and difficulty of creating
and expounding a separate system of law for the federal courts.
Two of the bitterest opponents of the Constitution and the
Judiciary Article were Elbridge Gerry and Richard Henry Lee.
Both refused to sign the Constitution. Both were leading
protagonists of the preservation of complete state sovereignty.
Gerry regarded the judiciary provisions of the Constitution as
the keystone to the national plan which the Constitution
embodied. Lee led the crusade for amending the Constitution
after its adoption. He utterly disliked and feared the judiciary
provisions. What these two men had to say about Article III
is, therefore, of extreme importance, by way of comparison with
what we have seen was the consensus among the moderates
and the ardent supporters of the Constitution as it now stands.
Gerry said:89 "My principle objections to the plan are
• . . that the judicial department will be oppressive. There
are no well-defined limits of the judiciary powers, they seem to
be left as a boundless ocean. It would be a Herculean labor to
attempt to describe the dangers with which they are replete."
One naturally asks, what dangers, why will the judiciary be
oppressive? Because it was bound to and, in fact, was devised
for the purpose of encroaching on the jurisdiction and exercise
of judicial power by the state courts. It would take matters
into its own hands and dispose of them differently than the
mistrusted state courts.
In speaking of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Lee wrote:90
"So far as this has gone, I am satisfied to see a spirit prevailing
that promises to send this system out, free from those vexations
16 Pet. at 10.

"Warren, op. cit. 54-55; see note 90, infra.

"2 The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, May 28, 1789 (to Patrick
Henry); Warren, op. cit. 62-63. In accord with Lee's view that the

Judiciary Act was a limitation on the Judiciary Article and did not
permit the federal courts to occupy the entire field opened to them
by the Constitution, see notes 19 and 25, supra.
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and abuses that might have been warranted by the terms of the
Constitution; .. .it must never be forgotten, however, that
the liberties of the people are not so safe under the gracious
manner of government as by the limitation of power." What
could be clearer than this statement? The Judiciary Act curbed
the powers of the federal courts which were inherent in the
Judiciary Article. The former was a limitation, the latter an
extensive grant, "as a boundless ocean". The Judiciary Act,
including of course the Rules of Decision section, placated Lee
and served as a substitute for the Constitutional Amendments
which he sought to have Congress adopt. But he would have
preferred an amendment of the Judiciary Article. Only in
that way could the powers of the federal courts be effectively
curbed. The limitation on their power should be made a part
of the grant creating them. The Judiciary Act as an Act of
Congress was merely a "gracious manner of government" and
could be repealed at any time.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the thesis advanced in this paper is furnished by Hamilton. In the plan
which he proposed for a Constitution, as an alternative to the
plans of Randolph and Paterson, he sought to analogize the
judicial process in the federal courts to that in the state courts
by providing that "all civil causes .. .which have been heretofore triable by jury in the respective States, shall in like
manner be tried by jury (in the federal courts) ".91 For the
nationalist that Hamilton was known to be, this appears to have
been a large concession to the advocates of complete state
sovereignty. It was, of course, not a complete surrender of the
judicial or any other federal power to the states; but it was a
deliberate effort to have the federal courts proceed identically
with the state courts in the very important matter of jury
trial, 92 which almost convulsed the Convention and continued
'I Journal of Debates 171.
"Jury trial was a question of substance, than which no more
important one convulsed the Convention and later critics of the Constitution. To A and B, whether citizens or non-residents of State X,
it was far more important that they should have the same right of
jury trial in the federal court sitting in X as in the state courts of X
than it was that the federal court should apply to their legal rights
the same contract, tort or property law as the courts of X. See long
discussion of this in The Federalist, No. LXXXIII, passim. And yet

the Constitution did not guarantee this right of jury trial! See The
Federalist, No. LXXXIII, 526-528.
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to be a bone of contention after the adoption of the Constitution. Hamilton's plan was not accepted by the Convention, and
even his gesture to the states in the matter of jury trial was not
taken up. What he has to say about the relation of federal
and state courts after the adoption of the Constitution is, therefore, of prime importance.
In the Federalist,he advocated the adoption of the Constitution, and explained and defended its various provisions. In
No. LXX III, he says:9 3 "This alone demonstrates the impolicy of inserting a fundamental provision in the Constitution which would make the state systems a standard for the
national government in the article under consideration, and
the danger of encumbering the government with any constitutional provisions, the propriety of which is not indisputable."
In other words, the Constitution itself did not contain the
essence of the Rules of Decision Act which the Supreme Court
in the Erie case has declared that it did contain!
In the same essay on the succeeding page, he again says:
"These appeared to be conclusive reasons against incorporating
the systems of all the states, in the formation of the national
judiciary, according to what may be conjectured to have been
the attempt of the Pennsylvania minority." 9 4 The Rules of
Decision Act is, therefore, not inherent in the Judiciary Article.
It is the culmination of the efforts of the Pennsylvania minority !
Again in the same essay, speaking of the argument made
by some, that trials in the federal courts should be the same as
in the state courts with respect to trial by jury, Hamilton
says: 95 "I presume it (i.e. this argument) to be, that causes
in the federal courts should be tried by jury, if, in the State
where the courts sat, that mode of trial would obtain in a
similar case in the state courts; that is to say, admiralty causes
should be tried in Connecticut by a jury, in New York without one. The capricious operation of so dissimilar a method of
trial in the same case, under the same government, is of itself
sufficient to indispose every well-regulated judgment towards it.
Whether the cause should be tried with or without a jury, would
depend in a great number of cases, on the accidental situation
of the court and parties." And Hamilton no doubt thought and
"Lodge ed., 527.

id., 528.
The Federalist, No. LXXXIII (Lodge ed.) 526.
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probably would have said, if the possibility had occurred to
him: "Whether the cause should be decided by the law of
A or B or by the principles of the common law as understood
and enforced by the federal courts cannot be made to depend
upon the fortuitous place where the court sits. The capricious
operation of so dissimilar a judicial process in the same cases,
under the same government, is of itself sufficient to indispose
every well-regulated judgment towards it."
Speaking of the grant to Congress of the power to institute
inferior federal courts, he uses language that bears an unmistakable resemblance to that employed by Mr. Winthrop. 96
"A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode
of trial.' ' 7 And he might have added, if he had not deemed it
clear beyond all peradventure: "and likewise the power to
determine the rule which is to govern such courts and the right
to define their powers and establish the rules by which their
judgment shall be regulated. '"98
Speaking of diversity of citizenship and certain other cases
covered by the Judiciary Article, he says: "The power of determining causes . . . between the citizens of different states, is
"
(italics
. . . essential to the peace of the Union ....
supplied).99
When it is borne in mind that Hamilton's purpose in the
Federalist was to "sell" the Constitution to those who were
chary of the encroachment of the national government on the
sovereignty of the states, his frank and repeated assumption of
the independence of the federal judiciary in all matters entrusted to its judicial power is highly significant. To an impartial student of language, unfettered by a vast accumulation
of judicial lore and sceptical of specious arguments, whether
based upon the provisions of the Constitution or anything else,
Hamilton's words furnish convincing proof that the federal
judiciary is endowed with complete independence of decision
in all matters which come within the scope of its judicial power.
"See note 79, supra, and text ad loc.
"The Federalist, No. LXXXIII (Lodge ed.) 518.

"Language to this effect was used by Winthrop. See note 79,
supra.
"The Federalist, No. LXXX (Lodge ed.) 496. Hamilton does
not speak of the power of determining causes in accordance with
principles laid down by other courts. The thought never occurred
to him and would have been swiftly repudiated if it had.
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In the same way that, we have set forth the statements and
comments of the more distinguished members of the Convention and contemporary and later jurists and constitutional
lawyers, we might cite innumerable other opinions which accord
with those herein cited. But that would extend to unreasonable
limits a paper which has already gone beyond the extent originally intended. Suffice it to say that the statements and
opinions of contemporaries, federalists and non-federalists,
nationalists and anti-nationalists, and others who were in a
position to know and should have apprehended the scope and
significance of the federal judicial power all lead inescapably to
the following conclusions:
1. The Judiciary Article invests' the federal courts with
complete independence of decision in all causes to which the
federal judicial power is made to extend, whether those causes
,now be deemed matters of national or only local concern. In
determining and disposing of such causes, the federal courts are
an end unto themselves and need neither consult nor defer to
the decisions of any other tribunal or judicial system.
2. The Rules of Decision Act is a limitation and curb on
the extensive judicial power of the courts under Article III. It
is a legislative exercise of the power inherent in the grant to
constitute inferior courts. As the will of the legislature, it may
be either repealed, or expanded or contracted; that is, the limitation on the power of the courts may be extended, restricted or
entirely removed. As a question of policy, it is of no concern to
the judiciary, which must simply enforce it as properly
construed.
3. Both under the Judiciary Article, section 2(1), as well
as section 1, and under the grant to Congress of the power to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court", Congress
has undoubted power not only to repeal the Rules of Decision
Act, but likewise to "create a code of laws"' 0 0 and "project a
general system of jurisprudence, coextensive with union"'' 1
and, in general, to establish the "rule which is to govern the
(federal) courts" 1 02 and to define "their powers and (deter10 3
mine) the rules by which their judgment shall be regulated".
supra.
See note 88,
See note 86, supra.
' See note 79, supra.
1*3idZ.
"®
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4. The majority opinion in the'Erie case as a constitutional
decision, being out of harmony with these conclusions, is judicial
legislation-is constitutional amendment by decision.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional amendment by decision is not an unfamiliar
occurrence in the unfolding of our judicial process. 10 4 It may
be wise or unwise. It may even be an usurpation of power by
the judiciary. The important thing is that it should be recognized when it occurs. If unwise, it can then be corrected.
Without passing judgment on the wisdom of the particular
amendment by decision in the Erie case, it is well to consider
what the decision should have been in the absence of such an
exercise (or, should we say, usurpation?) of the judicial power.
Mr. Justice Butler pointed out in the Erie case' 05 that the
discoveries and conclusions of Mr. Charles Warren, which
formed the basis of that decision had not been argued and that
their soundness could not simply be assumed, whether as a
matter of statutory interpretation or as a question of constitutional law. It may, for example, be that, in amending the
draft of the Rules of Decision section and in eliminating the
provision "their unwritten or common law . . . ." and in enacting the section as it now stands, Congress intended to make the
section inapplicable to the common law decisions of the state
courts. 10 6 Certainly that was the way Mr. Justice Chase con' See Sieveking, Die doppelte Gerichtsbarkeit in den Vereinigten
Staaten (1935), and book note ad id. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1222.
lMSee his dissenting opinion.
IN Mr. Warren (37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 88)
relied principally upon

three sources for his conclusion that the amendment of the draft of
Section 34 was not intended to alter its sense but merely to condense
its statement. The first was a report of Attorney General Randolph
to Congress, in which he used the term "laws" as covering both
statutory and common law. The statement had no reference to Section 34 and of course merely indicates how Randolph used or understood a particular term. The second was the Van Braam case, to
which reference has already been made (see notes 83, 86, supra).
Counsel on both sides were agreed in that case that the law of Rhode
Island should be applied under Section 34. Their sole dispute was as
to the effect of the Rhode Island law. Their arguments, therefore,
can hardly be considered more than persuasive and as indicating what
they understood by Section 34. Moreover, they urged that Section 34
should move the Court to apply the local law. They did not take
the position that Section 34 required that result. The Court, in a
very brief opinion, affirmed the judgment because of the "laws, and
the practical construction of the courts of Rhode Island." The Court
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strued it.107 And Mr. Justice Paterson, though regarding it as
binding "in some cases" curiously did not apparently regard
it as binding in all common law matters. 08 And the whole
court, in Swift v. Tyson, after a deliberate and thorough consideration of the question, expressly held that it was inapplicable
to the common law or law merchant question then before the
court. Surely they were in a better position to pass upon the
scope and extent of the judicial power than jurists of 1938.
Moreover, the court in the Erie case expressly recognized
that their decision could not stand on statutory grounds. Congress had clearly acquiesced in the construction given to the
Rules of Decision Act to exclude local common law matters for
well nigh a century, and had during that time re-enacted it as
so construed into the Revised Statutes. Perhaps, this latter day
Congress agreed with the court in Swift v. Tyson and all its
corollaries and if called upon today to legislate upon the matter
would enact a statute identical with the Act as construed for a
century or more.
As the Court pointed out in Swift v. Tyson, the instability
of common law decisions of the state courts, the fact that they
could be and frequently were overruled, argues strongly against
the duty of the federal courts to follow them in the absence of a
clear mandate of Congress to that effect. And above all, the
very nature of common law decisions "indisposes the well regulated judgment" to assume that Congress has imposed such a
mandate upon the federal courts, especially in view of Conobviously did not feel compelled to follow the local law. They did so
because it was expedient, simpler, and the wiser course, that is, out of
comity. At least, their opinion is open to that construction. And
Mr. Justice Chase concurred only in the judgment and refused to
concur on that ground. And Mr. Justice Paterson apparently did not
feel bound to concur on that ground (see note 83, supra). The third
authority relied upon was Sims v. Irvine, 3 Dall. 425 (1799). The
question in that case, however, was not so much whether the federal
courts should follow a local rule of substantive law but whether they
should apply in the law courts a remedy which was considered
peculiar to equity. There was no question of giving the plaintiff a
remedy which he could obtain only in Pennsylvania. The question
was whether he should obtain that remedy on the equity or law side
of the federal court. And the Court held that the federal courts in
Pennsylvania should give a remedy at law, because that was the only
remedy obtainable in the Pennsylvania courts; and it had there
"become an established legal right."
'
See note 87, supra.
"
See note 83, supra.

THE ERIE CASE
gress's acquiescence in the course of decision since Swift v.
Tyson.
According to the Blackstonian Theory, judicial decisions
are declaratory in nature. They do not make law. They discover the law as it has always existed. If that is the case, then
certainly federal courts, -with the assistance of able counsel, can
and should be permitted to discover and decide that law as well
as the state courts. They are less subject to the whims and
shifts of public opinion in the state, to which the local judges
often succumb. And even if the state courts are no longer subject to the will of their wicked masters, the legislature, the
tenure of office is short; and it is no secret and has not been
deemed a discredit to them that they often keep their eyes
riveted on the next election. Surely nothing could more seriously impair the soundness of their decisions than this uncertainty of continuity on the bench.
But the declaratory theory of judicial decision has been
questioned. Surely it received a terrific assault in the Erie
decision. It has been observed that courts often do not merely
discover the law. They frequently make the law, that is, they
legislate. Even those who are responsible for this observation
do not attempt to justify it. They state it as an empirical fact.
They do not say that courts should legislate. They merely
recognize that they do legislate. This is as much of an usurpation of power by the courts as assumption of jurisdiction would
be where none exists. The federal courts of course will not
recognize or follow an erroneous assumption or mistaken exercise of jurisdiction by the state courts where none exists. Why,
then, should they defer to an usurpation of legislative functions
by the state courts, if judicial decision is in fact legislative?
The answer naturally is, that whether or not they should as a
matter of policy, Congress has not clearly imposed upon them a
mandate to do so.
Regardless, therefore, of the angle from which we approach
the subject, whether from the standpoint of the Rules of Decision Act or the Judiciary Article, whether in the light of contemporary and propinquitous expositions of the Constitution or
from the nature and theory of judicial decision, the whole doctrine of the Erie case is unsound and collapses under impartial
scrutiny.
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That, however, does not mean that the result reached in the
Erie case is unwarranted, improper or cannot stand. For the
Supreme Court, as the ultimate reviewing tribunal, exercising
the complete independence of decision which we have seen the
entire federal judiciary possesses under the Constitution, may
well direct the lower federal courts in diversity matters to defer
to decisions of the state tribunals. 10 9 This has been the course
of decision in equity cases even before the Erie case plunged into
the constitutional question. 110 And it may perhaps be deemed
as much an exercise of the independent judicial power of the
federal courts as decision directly in conflct with the state deci-.
sions would be.'
But, if the federal courts adopted such a
course, it would be as a matter of comity or independent appraisal and decision rather than by reason of any non-existent
constitutional or statutory compulsion.

I Or, better, the Supreme Court, in determining the rules of law
to the applied in decisions which it reviews might simply arrive at a
conclusion which accords with the decisions of the particular state.
Thus, in State A where the law was that x = y, the Supreme Court,
having open to it that or any other conclusion, might decide to follow
the decisions of the courts of A rather than those of some other states
where x = z. This would, of course, establish the uniformity of
decision in the federal system, which was the object of Swift v. Tyson,
but it would nullify the object of the Erie case, which is to establish
uniformity of decision in each jurisdiction. There is this to be said
against the latter view and in favor of the former, that the Judiciary
Article certainly contemplates complete independence and uniformity
of decision in the federal courts, and that if the Erie case is unsound
on both constitutional and statutory (the Court was at least uncertain) grounds, we are remitted squarely to the provisions of the Constitution for a guide as to the power and operation of the federal
courts.
A subsequent article will be devoted to a consideration of the
various extensions of the Erie case since its decision. Although, as
observed in the text, the result of the Erie case can be justified, the
extensions of its doctrine cannot be regarded so sympathetically.
oSee note 23( supra.
See note 77, supra.

